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The  Court of Justice  holds  that the  monopoly of port handling 
operations in Porto di  Genova, Italy is incompatible with Article 
90(1) of the Treaty, read in conjunction with Articles 30, 48  and 
86. 
The  Commission  fines  Aer  Lingus  under  Article  86  for 
terminating  its  interline  agreement  with  British  Midlands. 
(IP/92/132) 1 
The Council adopts Regulation (EEC) No 479/92, authorizing the 
Commission to  adopt a block exemption for consortia. (OJ L 55, 
29.2.1992)2 
The Commission imposes fines on the "shipowners' committees" 
operating  on  the  trades  between  France  and  several  West  and 
Central African countries. (OJ L 134, 18.5.1992- IP/92/242) 
The Commission applies Regulation 4056/86 for the first time to 
ferry  services by exempting the joint operation of a ferry service 
between  the  Danish  port  of Elsinore  and  the  Swedish  port  of 
Helsingborg. (IP/92/396) 
The  Commission  adopts  interim  measures  under  Article  86 
ordering Sealink to alter its sailing times in the port of Holyhead. 
(IP/92/478) 
The  "third  package"  of measures  to  liberalize  air  transport  is 
adopted by the Council, with a view to creating a single market by 
1 January 1993. (OJ L 240, 24.8.1992) 
The Commission adopts a negative decision under Articles 85  and 
86  against the  CEWAL Liner Conference.  (OJ L  34,  10.2.1993, 
p.20- IP/92/1110) 
The Commission initiates infringement proceeding under Article 
90(3) against the Spanish Government for discrimination against a 
non-Spanish  ferry  company  by  the  95%  state-owned 
IP = Commission Press Release 
2  OJ= Official Journal of  the European Communities 
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The  Commission  initiates  proceedings  against  the  Far  Eastern 
Freight  Conference  (FEFC)  regarding  price  fixing  on  inland 
transport. (IP/93/7) 
The  Commission  grants  an  exemption  in  the  field  of combined 
transport of  goods for a period of five years. (IP/93/143) 
The Commission adopts block exemptions for the joint planning of 
schedules, the joint operation of air services on new or less busy 
routes,  slot allocation at  airports  and tariff consultations on fares 
with  a  view  to  the  granting  of interline  facilities.  (Commission 
Regulation. (EEC) No 1617/93, OJ L 155, 26.6.1993 and OJ L 177, 
29.6.1993- IP/93/521) 
The Commission opens up the market for storage and movement of 
jet fuel at Milan's Malpensa airport. (IP/93/684) 
The  Commission  initiates  consultations  regarding  competition 
arising  from  ground  handling  monopolies  in  most  European 
airports. (IP/93/1135, IP/93/714) 
The  Commission  closes  the  Irish  Club  Rules  case.  (OJ  C  263, 
29.9.1993, p.6) 
The Commission terminates proceedings against the  East African 
Conference,  following  agreement  by  the  parties  to  amend  the 
Conference  agreement  particularly  as  regards  notice  periods  for 
leaving the conference. (IP/93/739) 
The  Commission  adopts  a  formal  decision  regarding  the  port of 
Holyhead after a complaint from Sea Containers that Stena Sealink 
was refusing them access to the port. (OJ L 15,  18.1.1994) 
The  Commission requires Denmark to  give  access to  the port of 
R0dby,  or  to  build  new  port  facilities  next  to  the  port  under 
Article 90(3). (OJ L 55, 26.2.1994) 
Air Transport  After  discussions  between  lATA and  the  Commission  regarding 
restrictions  on  the  freedom  of passengers  to  purchase  tickets 
outside the country of travel origin, IAT  A excludes the application 
of  the  rule  from  the  EC,  Norway  and  Sweden.  lATA  also 
withdraws its rules on surcharge on air freight movements. 
Maritime 
Transport 
The  Spanish  Government  informs  the  Commission  that  it  has 
terminated the discrimination carried out by Transmediterranea by 
granting discounts only to certain categories of Spanish nationals. 
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Deutsche  Bahn  terminates  an  agreement  with  other  transport 
operators  and railway undertakings regarding a joint marketing 
entity based on a joint tariff grid in maritime container transport 
created in 1988, after the Commission sends out a statement of 
objections. 
The draft group  exemption regulation on consortia is  published 
and  the  Commission  invites  third  party  comments.  (OJ  C  63, 
1.3.1994 -IP/94/508) 
The  Commission  fines  Deutsche  Bahn  under  Article  86  for 
discriminatory pricing on its provision of traction and access to 
rail network. (OJ L 104, 23.4.1994, p.35- IP/94/259) 
The Court of Justice rules in Corsica Ferries v Corpo dei Piloti 
del Porto di  Genova,  a case concerning discriminatory tariffs in 
piloting  services  in  a  port  through  statutory  monopolies;  it 
reaffirms  that  the  Port  of Genoa  is  a  substantial  part  of the 
common market. (OJ C 174, 25.6.1994, p.4) 
Commissioner  van  Miert  gives  the  opening  speech  at  the 
Maritime Forum on Rotterdam on 20 June 1994, on the subject 
"Maritime Transport and Competition". (IP/94/559) 
Four co-operation arrangements in the field of rail transport are 
exempted  or given  negative  clearance:  Eurotunnel  (OJ  L  354, 
31.12.1995,  p.66),  ACI  (OJ  L  224,  30.8.1994,  p.28),  Night 
Services (OJ L 259,  7.10.1994, p.20),  and  CIA.  The first three 
concern  cooperation  for  the  Channel  Tunnel.  (IP/94/762, 
IP/94/826, IP/94/870, IP/94/1202) 
The Commission adopts a negative decision regarding the Trans-
Atlantic  Agreement,  and  prohibits  inland  price-fixing  and 
capacity non-utilisation arrangements.  (OJ  L  376,  31.12.1994 -
IP/94/956) 
The  Commission  decides  to  challenge  the  discount  system  at 
Brussels airport, under Article 90 in conjunction with Article 86. 
It  is  also  reviewing  the  situations  at  the  airports  of Madrid, 
Frankfurt and Milan. 
The  Commission  adopts  a  negative  decision regarding  the  Far 
Eastern  Freight  Conference  and  prohibits  inland  price  fixing-
agreement. (OJ L 378,31.12.1994- IP/94/1260) 
The  Commission  initiates  proceedings  against  Greece  under 
Articles 90 and 86 regarding Olympic Airways. 
The  Commission  adopts  a  proposal  for  a  Council  Directive 
regarding  access  to  the  ground-handling  services  markets  of 
5 airports. (IP/94/1206) 
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The TAA decision is suspended by the Court of First Instance. 
The Court of  Justice confirms the suspension. 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 870/95 of20 April 1995 on the 
application of Article 85  (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements,  decisions  and  concerted  practices  between  liner 
shipping  companies  (consortia)  enters  into  force.  (OJ  L  89, 
21.4.1995- IP/95/409) 
The  Commission  grants  interim  measures  against  the  Morlaix 
Chamber of Commerce regarding access to the port of  Roscoff in 
Brittany by Irish ferries. (IP/95/492) 
The  Commission  adopts  a  report  on  competition  and  liner 
shipping,  focusing  on inland price  fixing  by liner conferences. 
(SEC (94) 933) 
The  Commission  adopts  a  decision  requesting  the  Belgian 
authorities to  end the system of discounts on landing fees  at the 
Zaventem airport under Article 90(3). (OJ L 216, 12.9.1995, p. 8) 
The Multimodal Group is set up, chaired by Sir Bryan Carsberg, 
to  consider  the  Commission's  policy  relating  to  inland  price 
fixing by liner conferences. 
The Commission adopts an interim decision regarding access to 
stevedoring services in the Porto di  Genova under Article 90(3). 
(IP/95/802) 
The  Court  of First  Instance  dismisses  an  application  by  the 
TACA Parties to suspend the anticipated lifting of  immunity from 
fines in respect of  inland price fixing. 
The  Commission  exempts  a  co-operation  agreement  between 
Lufthansa  and  SAS  for  ten  years,  making  the  approval 
conditional on the companies giving up  slots at certain airports. 
(IP/96/49) 
The Multimodal Group in February submits its interim report to 
Commissioner van Miert, who transmits it to the Council. (ISBN 
92-827  -6964X) 
The Commission accepts proposals from the Danish Government 
to  resolve  competition  problems  in  the  port  of  Elsinore. 
(IP/96/205) 
In  March  and  April  1996,  the  Commission  exempts  four 
consortium  agreements  under  Regulation  870/95:  the  St 
Lawrence  Co-ordinated  Service,  the  East  African  Container 
Service,  the  Joint  Mediterranean  Canada Service  and the  Joint 
7 Pool Agreement. (IP/96/400) 
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The Commission grants individual exemptions to the Baltic Liner 
Conference,  to  Hansa  Ferry,  and  to  Stena  Tor  Line  under 
Regulation 4056/86. 
The Commission adopts a decision that recommended tariffs for 
shipping  services in seaports  and  at  land frontiers  produced by 
Fenex were in breach of  Article 85. 
The Commission adopts Regulation (EC) No  1523/96 excluding 
consultations on tariffs for the carriage of freight from the scope 
of the group exemption, thus making these consultations subject 
to control under Article 85, taking effect from 1 July 1997. 
The Commission opens procedures under Article 89  in the four 
transatlantic  airline  alliance  cases:  BA/  AA, 
Lufthansa/SAS/United,  Sabena!Swissair/  Austrian/Delta, 
KLM/N  orthwest. 
The Council adopts  Directive 96/67  /EC of 15  October 1996 on 
access to the ground-handling market at Community airports. (OJ 
L 272, 25.10.1996) 
The Commission fines P&O, Stena-Sealink, Brittany Ferries, Sea 
France and North Sea Ferries a total amount of ECU 645,000 for 
the  operation of a price cartel in  1992  on the English Channel. 
(OJ L 26,29.1.1997- IP/96/971) 
The Court of  First Instance rejects an appeal against the Decision 
ofthe Commission in the CEW  AL case. 
A Commission study finds that Europe's free market in air travel 
has delivered cheaper fares,  new airlines and a wider choice of 
routes, but that there is still room for improvement. (IP/96/950) 
The  Commission  decides  to  lift  the  immunity of fines  for  the 
inland  price  fixing  arrangements  of  the  T  ACA  Parties. 
(IP /96/1 096) 
The  Commission  institutes  Article  169  proceedings  against 
Belgium  regarding  the  discount  system  at  Brussels-National 
Airport. 
The North Sea Liner Conference is  exempted under Regulation 
4056/86. (IP/97112) 
The following consortia are granted exemption under Regulation 
870/95:  the  Joint  Operational  Service  and  the  West 
Coast/Mediterranean  Agreement,  the  VSA agreements between 
Sea Land, P&ONedlloyd, Maersk and OOCL, and the NCS and 
the Eurosal III. 
9 October 1997  Airports  Following undertakings received from the Greek Authorities and 
Olympic Airways,  the  Commission ends a procedure, based on 
Articles 86 and 90. (IP/97  /876) 
Ports 
Ports 
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The  Commission  adopts  an  Article  90(3)  decision  against  the 
Porto  de  Genoa  concerning  the  port  companies'  monopoly  on 
supplying workers. (IP/97 /907) 
The  Commission  adopts  an  Article  90(3)  decision  against  the 
Porto  de  Genoa  concerning  a  discriminatory  rebate  system  on 
pilotage tariffs. (IP  /97 /907) 
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A  AIR TRANSPORT 
Commission Exempts the Acquisition by Lufthansa, Japan Airlines and Nissho 
Iwai of Interests in DHL International after Obtaining Assurances of Non 
Discrimination 
Date: 1991-01-11 
IP/91/23 
The European Commission has granted an exemption under the EEC competition rules 
for  the  acquisition  of interests  in  DHL  International  (DHLI)  by Lufthansa,  Japan 
Airlines and Nissho Iwai. 
This exemption was granted under Article 85(3) after Japan Airlines and Lufthansa 
gave assurances to the Commission that they would not discriminate against those of 
DHL's competitors which are likely to be especially dependent!) on the services and 
facilities provided by these carriers, in particular as regards freight rates and access to 
aircraft capacity or to handling facilities. 
The assurances apply to  companies which already compete with DHLI in Europe or 
which may do  so  in the  future,  for  express  door-to-door delivery of documents or 
packages within the operational weight limits ofDHLI. 
The  Commission judged  these  assurances  to  be  sufficient  and,  taking  them  into 
account, considered that the agreements were well-balanced. It has therefore decided 
to grant an exemption by allowing the statutory 90-day limit to expire, with the result 
that the notified agreements are exempted for a maximum of three years (for that part 
of  the arrangements which are under the road transport Regulation) or six years (under 
the air transport Regulation). 
1)  The following are considered not to be especially dependent on these services or 
facilities: 
Major  integrated  express  delivery  companies,  their  agents  and  subsidiaries;  Post 
Office EMS services; undertakings in which one or more of the 20 leading airlines, 
based on international cargo ton- miles on scheduled services, have a shareholding; 
and undertakings with which such airlines  enjoy  a  special contractual arrangement 
which,  according  to  one  or  more  of the  parties  to  such  arrangement,  generates 
advantages in the provision of  express services. 
12 Commission Fines Aer Lingus for Withdrawing Interlining Rights 
IP/92/132 
Date: 1992-02-26 
Following a complaint by British Midland, the Commission has found that Aer Lingus 
has  abused  its  dominant  position,  in  breach  of Article  86  of the  EEC  Treaty,  by 
terminating  its  interlining  agreement  with  British  Midland.  The  Commission  has 
imposed a fine of 750,000 ECU on Aer Lingus and ordered it to resume its interlining 
relationship with British Midland. 
Aer Lingus is the dominant airline on the London-Dublin route. After British Midland 
announced its intention in  1989 to  start its own service on that route in competition 
with  Aer  Lingus,  Aer  Lingus  terminated  its  interlining  relationship  with  British 
Midland. As a result of that action, passengers holding British Midland tickets could 
no longer, as of right, change flights onto Aer Lingus services and travel agents could 
no  longer  issue  tickets  combining  flights  by  both  airlines.  The  withdrawal  of 
interlining  facilities  made  British Midland's  flights  less  attractive  to  travellers  - in 
particular business travellers who prefer the higher-priced fully flexible tickets - and to 
travel  agents.  By terminating  its  interlining  relationship,  Aer Lingus  made it  more 
difficult for British Midland to  compete. British Midland was deprived of significant 
revenue and forced to  incur higher costs in order to  overcome the handicap imposed 
on it. 
Sir Leon Brittan,  EC  Commissioner for  competition policy,  said:  "This  decision  is 
evidence of the Commission's determination to  act against airlines holding dominant 
positions, if they attempt to  prevent the development or maintenance of competition. 
At a time when the European air transport industry is being liberalised, airlines making 
use of the new opportunities for competition should be given a fair chance to develop 
and  sustain  their  challenge  to  established  carriers".  Airlines  holding  dominant 
positions  should  not  penalise  this  competition.  They should not withhold facilities 
which the industry traditionally provides to all other airlines, and they should take care 
to compete strictly on the merits of  their own services. 
The  Commission  consequently  took  the  view  that  Aer  Lingus  should  resume  its 
interlining  relationship  with  British  Midland.  However,  it  also  accepts  that  new 
entrants should not be able to rely indefinitely on frequencies and services provided by 
their  competitors,  but  must  be  encouraged  to  develop  their  own  frequencies  and 
services. Therefore the duration of a duty to interline can be limited to the time period 
which is objectively necessary for a competitor to become established on the market. 
Taking into account that three years have lapsed since British Midland started its new 
services, the duty to interline imposed by the decision has been limited to  two years 
from  now,  subject to  review in  the  light of the development of competition on the 
relevant route. 
Interlining 
Interlining is  essentially based on an lATA agreement pursuant to  which most of the 
world's airlines have authorised the other signatories to  sell their services. As a result 
travel  agents  can  offer  passengers  a  single  ticket  providing  for  transportation  by 
different carriers (e.g. leaving on the airline issuing the ticket and returning on another 
13 airline serving the same route, or continuing to destinations not served by the issuing 
airline). 
In  addition,  airlines  recognise  each  other's  authority  to  change  a  ticket  so  that 
passengers can change reservations and routings on airlines after the ticket has been 
issued. These changes would normally require the consent of the airline indicated on 
the ticket for  the  sector concerned ("endorsement") but most airlines have agreed to 
waive this requirement in practice. 
As a result the interlining system benefits airlines, travel agents and passengers alike; 
it enables the issuing of travel documents for complex journeys and allows flexible 
uses of these documents with minimal constraints. It is  a very significant part of the 
worldwide air transport system and is of  particular value to business travellers. 
New Block Exemptions In Air Transport 
IP/93/521 
Date: 1993-06-25 
On  a  proposal  by  Commissioner  Van  Miert,  the  Commission  has  approved  new 
Commission regulations on cooperation between airlines. 
These regulations on "block exemptions"  to  enter into  force  on  1 July,  set  out the 
conditions under which airlines are  authorised, under the EEC  competition rules,  to 
cooperate in certain ways. 
The new rules are part of the third package of air transport liberalisation. That package 
created an internal market in air transport which opens the way for more competition 
throughout the Community. This new environment does not, however, prevent airlines 
from joining forces in particular areas where transport users benefit from cooperation 
provided that  effective  competition  is  guaranteed.  The  block  exemptions  define  in 
what areas airlines can cooperate and the conditions which must be satisfied for their 
cooperation to be acceptable. 
The new block exemptions adopted for  5 years from  July 1993  cover the following 
categories of agreements. Broadly, these exemptions are similar to  the previous ones 
with the exception of  joint operations which is a new form of cooperation covered by 
the block exemptions. 
Joint planning and coordination of  schedules 
Airlines may agree to  coordinate schedules with a view to  providing service at  less 
busy times  or to  facilitate  connections for  passengers from  one airline to  the  other. 
Airlines  must  remain  free  to  introduce  additional  services  and  to  terminate  the 
coordination on reasonable notice. 
Joint operations 
14 This block exemption enables smaller airlines to operate a service with marketing and 
financial support from another airline, thereby helping them to develop new routes or 
to continue service on less busy routes. In order to maintain effective competition, the 
partner airlines must be free to  operate independently alongside the joint operation if 
they wish to  do  so.  The block exemption authorises joint operations for three years ; 
after that time, the Commission will have to consider whether or not to approve each 
operation on an individual basis. 
Tariff consultations 
Even though discussions on pricing are  usually a serious restriction of competition, 
tariff consultations in the airline industry may be treated favourably in so far as they 
facilitate interlining, i.e. the possibility for passengers to combine services by different 
airlines on a single ticket and to  change reservations from  one airline onto  another. 
However, in order to maintain effective competition, participating airlines may not be 
prevented from charging their own prices if they wish.  The Commission will follow 
this area carefully during the next few  years and will, if necessary, make changes to 
the block exemption if  there is any lack of effective price competition in the EC airline 
sector. 
Slot allocation 
Airlines are authorised to  agree on the distribution of airport slots under a number of 
conditions, essentially intended to make sure that the process is open to  all interested 
airlines and that slot allocation is transparent and non discriminatory. In line with the 
Council  regulation  on  the  same  subject,  the  Commission  insists  on  favourable 
treatment  for  the  new  entrants  in  order  to  ensure  that  there  are  genuine  access 
opportunities even at congested airports. 
Computer reservation systems 
There  is  a block exemption currently in  force  which allows  airlines  to  set  up  and 
operate jointly-owned computer reservation systems  under a number of conditions, 
essentially intended to make sure that all intered airlines have access to these systems 
and  that  they  do  not  discriminate  against  other  airlines.  There  is  also  a  Council 
Regulation on the same subject which is being amended. Therefore, the current block 
exemption will be extended until the  end of this  year,  so  that due  account may be 
taken of  the changes to the Council regulation. 
Commissioner Van Miert concluded : 
"These  block  exemptions  will  enable  airlines  to  cooperate  even  in  commercially 
sensitive areas, in order to  lower costs and improve service. At the  same time, they 
limit cooperation to areas where there are genuine consumer benefits and they contain 
safeguards in order to protect effective competition. The Commission retains the rights 
to  intervene in  individual  cases where these  objectives  are  not met,  but otherwise 
agreements which are covered by the new regulations will not need to be notified to 
the Commission". 
15 Statement By Mr Van Miert On Ground Handling Services For Air Transport 
IP/93/714 
Date: 1993-08-25 
Now that the third set of  measures liberalizing Community air transport is in place, the 
Commission has to ensure that their effect is not diluted by restrictions on competition 
in the provision of ground handling services at airport. 
The Commission has received ten formal complaints from airlines on this subject. The 
press has recently reported some of these complaints about the position at Milan and 
Frankfurt airports and at Spanish airports. These complaints, along with others about 
similar cases, are being examined by my officials, in the light of the competition rules 
of  the EEC, Treaty in order to deal with any abuses of dominant positions which could 
anse. 
Aside from infringement proceedings against individual abuses, I am convinced that 
the real problem lies with the granting to operators by the authorities of exclusive or 
special rights for the provision of ground handling services. These monopolies restrict 
competition to  the detriment either of airlines prepared to  supply these services or of 
independent  ground-handling  companies.  These  restrictions  apply  even,  in  some 
cases,  to  "self-handling"  services  which  airlines  provide  to  meet  their  own 
requirements. 
To the Commission it is of paramount importance for the right of airlines to organize 
their  own  ground  handling  services  to  be  respected,  whether  those  services  are 
individually or jointly organized.  In view of this  we  are  drawing  up  measures  for 
opening up  this market to  effective competition in order to  improve the quality and 
reduce the cost of these services while observing national rules and regulations in so 
far as they are necessary to  ensure full service at all times combined with security at 
airports and passenger protection. 
Above and beyond the  question of processing complaints without delay, it seems to 
me that a  general move to  settle  the  conditions under which the  competition rules 
should apply in this  sector would be a way of opening up  these markets, on those 
conditions,  in  all  12  Member  States.  So  that  action  can  be  taken  as  swiftly  as 
necessary  it  should  in  my  opinion  take  the  form  of a  directive  adopted  by  the 
Commission itself using its powers under Article 90 of  the EEC Treaty. A preliminary 
draft  prepared  by  my  officials  is  even  now  the  subject  of  inter-departmental 
discussions within the Commission. A move of this kind would only be completed, of 
course, after consulting the Member States and all institutions and parties concerned. 
16 Commission Imposes Conditions On Cooperation Agreement Between Lufthansa 
And SAS 
IP/96/49 
Date: 1996-01-16 
On Tuesday, acting on a proposal from Mr Karel Van Miert, the Commission Member 
with  special  responsibility  for  competition  policy,  the  Commission  approved  in 
Strasbourg a cooperation agreement concluded on 11  May 1995  between Lufthansa 
and SAS. 
However,  the  Commission  imposed  four  conditions  covenng  the  following  mam 
points: 
(a) At Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Stockholm and Oslo airports, where available capacities 
are  saturated at peak periods, Lufthansa and  SAS  must as  necessary give up  up  to 
eight slots a day to other airlines wishing to operate services on the following routes: 
- Dusseldorf-Copenhagen 
-Dusseldorf-Stockholm 
-Frankfurt-Copenhagen 
- Frankfurt-Gothenburg 
- Frankfurt-Oslo 
- Frankfurt-Stockholm 
- Hamburg-Stockholm 
- Munich-Copenhagen. 
(b) Where a new entrant starts operating on one of those routes, Lufthansa and SAS 
may not increase the number of their daily frequencies by more than one. However, 
this  figure  may  be  increased  to  match,  but  not  exceed,  the  combined  number  of 
frequencies operated by airlines other than Lufthansa and SAS. 
(c)  The  new  entrants  must,  subject  to  certain  conditions,  be  able  to  conclude 
interlining agreements with and participate in the joint frequent-flyer programme of 
Lufthansa and SAS. 
(d)  Lufthansa and  SAS  must terminate  the  following  cooperation agreements  with 
other airlines: 
- SAS must terminate its cooperation agreement with Swissair and Austrian Airlines 
within the European Quality Alliance; 
- Lufthansa must  terminate  its  cooperation  agreement  with Transwede  within  the 
Marketing Alliance in Scandinavia; 
- Lufthansa must terminate its cooperation agreement with Finnair in respect of  routes 
between Scandinavia and Germany. 
These conditions are applicable until 31  October 2002. 
The  Commission has  also  asked the two  airlines  to  provide regular information on 
how their cooperation is working in practice, particularly as regards the level of fares 
17 charged. This information will be particularly important in enabling the Commission 
to assess the agreement's impact on air transport users. 
The parties intend through the agreement to  create a long-term alliance, establishing 
an operationally and commercially integrated air transport system. 
The agreement provides for the setting-up of a joint venture to act on behalf of  the two 
airlines  as  their  exclusive  vehicle  for  offering  scheduled  passenger  and  cargo  air 
transport services between Scandinavia and Germany. However, the joint venture will 
not be a new airline.  The transport services will be supplied to  the joint venture by 
Lufthansa  and  SAS  in  their  own  names,  on  the  basis  of close  operational  and 
commercial cooperation, which will include the setting of  fares. 
As  regards  worldwide  cooperation,  the  parties  intend  to  establish  an  integrated 
transport  system  involving  joint network  planning,  a joint pricing  policy  and  the 
harmonization  of product  and  service  levels,  though  without  creating  a  common 
entity. 
According to  the parties, the object of the cooperation is twofold:  firstly, to  enhance 
the two airlines' European and worldwide networks and, secondly, to carry out a plan 
for reducing their costs. 
The economic significance of the arrangement is considerable. In terms of  passenger-
kilometres within Europe, Lufthansa and SAS  are  respectively the second and third 
largest European  airlines.  Their cooperation agreement will thus have the effect of 
restricting competition significantly, particularly on routes between Scandinavia and 
Germany. 
However, account must also be taken of the positive aspects of the agreement, which 
must be seen in the light of  the restructuring of  European air transport. 
The alliance between the two airlines will give them a much more efficient worldwide 
network,  enabling  them  to  stand  up  more  effectively  to  competition  from  other 
airlines,  notably  non-European  airlines.  Furthermore,  the  study  on  the  future  of 
European air transport carried out in 1993 by the "Committee of Wise Men" showed 
that the European airlines  are  handicapped by much higher unit costs than those of 
American  or Asian  airlines.  The  cost reduction  plan accompanying  the  agreement 
between Lufthansa and SAS. 
Consumers  will  derive  benefit  from  the  agreement,  firstly,  by having  much more 
extensive services available, notably as  regards network size, better connections and 
the  availability  of a  joint  frequent-flyer  programme  and,  secondly,  by benefiting 
indirectly from the airlines' lower costs. 
The Commission has therefore concluded that the cooperation can be authorized for a 
period of ten years, but that conditions should be imposed to  allow other airlines to 
operate services on the routes between Scandinavia and Germany in competition with 
Lufthansa and SAS. 
In general, the Commission has adopted the same approach in this case as that adopted 
in 1995 in the Swissair/Sabena case. In the wake of the liberalization of European air 
transport, new groupings between airlines may be useful in helping airlines to adjust to 
18 new  market  conditions,  provide  a  better  service  to  consumers  and  deal  more 
effectively with competition from non-Community airlines. 
The Commission has no  wish to  stand in the way of such operations, but it  has to 
ensure  that  competition  is  not  eradicated  on  the  routes  in  question  and  that  new 
airlines can still enter the market and compete with established airlines. 
Europe's Free Market In Air Travel Has Delivered Cheaper Fares, New Airlines 
And A  Wider Choice  Of Routes, But There Is Still Room For Improvement, 
Commission Study Finds 
IP/96/950 
Date: 1996-10-24 
Since  1993  when the European Union dismantled national barriers to  air travel and 
began the final stage of opening Europe's air transport up to competition, the number 
of routes has increased and monopolies have been broken up;  20  new airlines have 
opened for business, and fares have fallen.  Indeed, given the drop in the ticket price 
for many scheduled routes and the fact that the charter market accounts for more than 
half the total market, around 90 per cent of all passengers now travel on cheap fares. 
The  European Commission's  approach to  creating  a  single  market in European air 
travel,  first  launched in 1987, was  deliberately phased in three  stages to  avoid the 
market  disruption  that  was  the  US  experience  of the  "Big  Bang"  approach  to 
1iberalisation. The last barrier falls in Europe in April 1997 after which any EU airline 
may fly between two points anywhere in the Union. 
In anticipation of that date, the Commission has published a report into the impact of 
the third and final stage of libera1isation from 1993-1996 to assess progress so far and 
outline future action. Presenting the report Neil Kinnock, European Commissioner for 
Transport  Policy,  said:  "Liberalisation  is  not  an  end  in  itself.  The  opening  of the 
market has a meaning only if  the highest possible safety standards are maintained and 
increased  competition  ensures  that  the  travelling  public  are  better  served  at  lower 
cost."  He  drew  attention  to  four  areas  where,  despite  significant  gains,  the  report 
suggests that more work needed to  be done:  continued monitoring of air fares,  the 
lifting  of capacity  restrictions,  the  reduction  of air  transport  costs,  and  improved 
market access. He pledged to use EU legislation to prise open those sectors of the air 
market that still remain closed to  free  and fair competition to  ensure that the public 
gets a fair deal from a liberalised European air market that is efficient and competitive 
while upholding the highest possible standards of  safety, environmental protection and 
public service. 
Airline liberalisation - EU style 
The report notes that: "The single market in aviation did not occur with a "Big Bang": 
there  was no  spectacular reduction in fares  nor  any  dramatic  disappearance  of the 
more important carriers. Liberalisation has happened in a progressive way and without 
major upsets. This contrasts with the situation that the US  experienced at the time of 
the  deregulation of the  aviation market.  The  Community has been able to  find  the 
19 correct balance between competition and  control mechanisms.  Competition and the 
consumer have both benefitted." 
Between 1993 and 1996: 
- The number of  routes flown rose from 490 to 520 
- 30 per cent of Community routes are now served by two operators and six per cent 
by three  operators  or more,  against  two  per cent in  1993.  The  dominant  carrier's 
market share often fell to the advantage of  the second carriers. 
- 80 new airline companies were created, 60 disappeared 
- Air fares  fell on the routes where at least three operators are in competition. These 
tend to  be the largest in terms of traffic and thus represent a substantial part of the 
market,  eg:  from  Brussels  to  Madrid,  Barcelona,  Milan,  Rome,  Vienna  and 
Copenhagen and from London to Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels and Frankfurt, as well as 
on certain domestic routes in France, Germany and Spain. An impressive number of 
promotional fares has developed and the share of passengers travelling on scheduled 
flights with tickets at reduced prices rose from 60.5 per cent in 1985 to 70.9 per cent 
in 1995. Taking into account the fact that the share of the charter market accounts for 
approximately 50 per cent of the total market, some 90 to 95  per cent of passengers 
are travelling at prices significantly lower than those in operation in 1993. 
More still needs to be done 
The report nonetheless notes that much still needs to  be done to  consolidate on this 
very encouraging beginning and has pledged action in four specific areas. 
1.  Air  fares.  Despite  the  advances  in  the  development  of promotional  fares  the 
Commission  is  concerned  that  most  of the  fully  flexible  fares  have  continued  to 
increase. On certain routes these could be described as excessive. Also, the procedures 
by which the fares  are  arrived at are  little understood and certainly not transparent, 
which makes it difficult for consumers to  take the best advantage of the wider travel 
opportunities that liberalisation has, overall, created. 
The Commission has pledged to investigate those cases where fares seem particularly 
high  and,  if necessary,  will  use  the  existing  legislation  against  the  imposition  of 
excessive fares  to  correct them. It costs  for  example six times less per kilometre to 
travel from London to Palma de Majorca than it does from Strasbourg to Vienna. The 
Commission will also look at ways of ensuring the public is better informed as to how 
fares are set in the market. 
2.  Capacity restrictions.  Competition,  clearly,  has  led  to  an  increase  in  traffic  and 
potential  problems  in  terms  of capacity  limitations  on  runways  and  at  airport 
terminals. Congestion in the sky is also putting a strain on air traffic management. 
The  Commission  will  propose  revisions  to  the  existing  legislation  regulating  slot 
allocation by the end of the year with the aim of optimising capacity and encouraging 
more competition.  In March it submitted a paper on air traffic management (ATM) 
which proposes common rules applied at the broadest European level so that air traffic 
can be managed more efficiently. 
20 3.  Air  transport  costs.  Infrastructure  costs  alone  account  for  25  per  cent  of all 
operational costs. In the EU these costs are already 40 per cent higher than those in the 
US.  Airlines themselves  are  restructuring,  in large  part as  a result of the  increased 
competition brought about  by liberalisation,  to  bring  down the  costs that they  can 
control. But more could be done to reduce those charges that are outside their control. 
The Council has already approved legislation designed to  liberalise groundhandling. 
In terms of ATM, the Commission has proposed the separation of regulation from the 
provision of services which should improve the cost/efficiency ratio for airlines. The 
Commission also plans to  submit a proposal before the year end to make airport fees 
more transparent and non-discriminatory and to ensure that the charge is more closely 
linked to the cost of  the service provided. 
4.  Market Access. Increased competition and the rapid globalisation of the air market 
has led to  the rapid development of alliances and associated practices such as code-
sharing and franchising arrangements. Airlines are increasingly coming to realise that 
a reliance on state aid cannot be a guarantee of medium or long term competitiveness 
and all national EU carriers are seeking to privatise all or part of their operations. The 
Commission's role in regulating these alliances and developments is becoming ever-
more important. While the report shows that Europe's internal market is flourishing the 
full potential of the changes will not be felt so  long as  their is no  single external air 
market. 
The  Commission is  thus  negotiating  agreements  with  the  US  and  the  countries  of 
central and eastern Europe, to ensure that competition is free, fair and reciprocal. Extra 
vigilance will be required to ensure that alliances do not become a disguised means of 
restricting the market. To this end, the Commission will use all its powers under the 
competition rules to investigate perceived or actual abuses of a dominant position and 
will pursue an ever-stricter approach to state aid. 
Conclusions 
- A large number of airlines have been set up since 1993. 
- In the case of scheduled traffic, the development of capacity (expressed in numbers 
of flights or seats available) has been mainly attributable to  the activities of smaller 
carriers. 
- The share of the national carriers in total output is  declining compared with their 
direct competitors (eg. Ryanair's output is already more than half  that of  Aer Lingus). 
- The charter market is  continuing to  grow as  a result of the changes brought about 
between 1993 and 1996. In certain countries charter traffic may account for more than 
80 per cent of  total traffic. 
- In keeping with the international trend, alliances within the Community continue to 
develop. 
- 1995 stands out as the year when most of the European scheduled airlines got back 
into the black thanks, among other things, to  sustained traffic growth couples with a 
moderate increase in output. This was reflected in improved load factors and increased 
productivity. 
21 - The flying public have greatly benefitted from  a wider choice of routes, operators 
and  fares  but  they  are  entitled  to  expect  more.  The  Commission  will  take  action 
wherever justified  and  possible  and  work  with  the  airline  industry  and  consumer 
organisations to increase transparency and raise public awareness, enabling travellers 
to  take full  advantage of the potential created by liberalisation. Airline liberalisation 
cannot  and  must  not  lead  to  a  weakening  of safety  or  environmental  protection 
standards.  The  Commission is  thus working  actively on improving  the  Community 
aviation  safety  framework  and  limiting  the  impact  of increased  air  traffic  on  the 
environment. 
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Commission Opens Up The Market For The Storage And Movement Of Jet Fuel 
At Milan's New Malpensa Airport 
IP/93/684 
Date: 1993-07-30 
Under an  agreement between certain oil companies  and  the managing company of 
Milan's Malpensa Airport, a joint venture was created under the name DISMA for the 
installation and operation of equipment for storing jet fuel and transferring it to supply 
points on the site of the new airport.  The Commission demanded,  and has obtained, 
the  changes  needed  to  guarantee  non-discriminatory  access  for  the  companies 
operating on this market. 
The agreement envisages the creation on the site of  the airport of a new fixed aircraft-
refuelling installation essentially comprising a fuel and lubricant depot directly linked 
via underground pipelines to  supply points.  This  will enable  fuel  to  be transferred 
direct from  the depot's reservoirs to  the  fuel  tanks of aircraft by means of specially 
installed pipelines and pumping equipment without the use of the traditional tankers. 
Once  it  has  been completed,  this  equipment will be the  only  means  of refuelling 
aircraft at the new airport. 
At the outset, the Commission acknowledged that the technological characteristics of 
the  DISMA  installations  would  enable  jet  fuel  to  be  stored  and  transported 
advantageously in terms  of Community environmental legislation,  particularly with 
regard to traffic and air pollution. Moreover, the advantages benefit not only the oil 
companies but also the customer airlines and their users. 
However, the initial version of the agreements notified to  the Commission contained 
clauses preventing non-DISMA companies from having access on non-discriminatory 
terms  to  the  joint  venture's  services.  For  one  thing,  the  almost  insurmountable 
obstacles making impossible in practice the transfer of holdings in DISMA to  third 
parties prevented the latter from gaining access to the market. The founding members 
had also agreed to impose significantly higher charges on non-members. Some users 
of DISMA's installations and services were thus forced to accept unequal conditions 
for equivalent services, and this placed them at a competitive disadvantage. 
In view of the foregoing considerations, and given the more important role that Milan 
Malpensa Airport is likely to play as regards air transport in the Community, a sector 
which is  gradually  being  liberalized,  the  Commission  initiated proceedings  with  a 
view to  eliminating these  unjustified barriers  to  access  and  ensuring neutrality  and 
equality of  treatment for all users of  DISMA's installations, it being borne in mind that 
all  oil companies,  whether or not members of the joint venture,  have  to  use  these 
installations  to  supply  their  customers.  The  members  of DISMA  have  therefore 
proposed a uniform tariff although actual charges are on a sliding scale according to 
the  quantities  of jet fuel  supplied.  The  principle  of a  sliding  scale  can  indeed be 
justified by the existence of fixed costs associated with the services supplied to each 
customer. 
23 The parties to the agreement have finally agreed that access by firms not participating 
in  the  capital of DISMA  should  be  made  easier  once  Malpensa's  static  refuelling 
system is operational. 
The  Commission takes  the  view  that  the  agreements  concerning  the  DISMA joint 
venture are now compatible with the common market. Accordingly, it has adopted a 
favourable  position  in  their regard  and  has  terminated  the  proceedings  it  initiated 
earlier. 
The  Commission  Approves  Draft  Directive  On  Market  Access  Of  Ground 
Handling Services In Airports 
IP/94/1206 
Date: 1994-12-13 
On a proposal from Mr Marcelino Oreja, the member of the Commission responsible 
for  transport,  with  the  agreement  of Mr Van  Miert,  the  member  responsible  for 
competition, the Commission has adopted a draft Directive designed to open up access 
to the ground handling market in Community airports. 
Ground handling means all services provided at  airports to allow airlines to  perform 
their air transport activities. These range from marshalling of  the aircraft on the ground 
to cleaning, refuelling, and passenger and baggage registration and handling. 
Most airports  in the  Community reserve  the  right to  provide these  services  for  the 
national carrier or the airport itself. This situation is out of keeping with the principle 
of free competition, which calls for complete liberalization of air transport. 
For this reason, in accordance with the conclusions of the Comite des Sages and with 
its own action programme on civil aviation approved on a proposal from Mr Oreja in 
June,  the  Commission  has  decided  to  present  the  Council  with  a  proposal  for  a 
Directive on this subject. This proposal attempts to strike a balance between the need 
for optimum management of airport infrastructure and,  on the other hand, European 
air carriers' needs to remain competitive against carriers from outside the Union, by 
gaining a firmer grip on their costs, a large proportion of which are accounted for by 
ground handling. 
The proposal adopted by the Commission is intended: 
- to  define  Community rules  which will  allow  effective  application of the  general 
principles laid down in the Treaty to the specific ground handling market; 
- to  introduce  detailed  rules  to  accompany  the  principles  of liberalization  of air 
transport and of the ancillary activities, by organizing access to the various categories 
of handling service and granting airlines the right to provide their own services (self-
handling); 
24 - to make costs more transparent by keeping the accounts and funding for handling 
activities  separate  and  prohibiting  any  funding  which  could  distort  competition. 
However, to allow for the unique nature of  airports and of  the numerous constraints on 
space, capacity, security and safety imposed on the managing bodies, it was essential 
to  define certain framework measures laying down a transparent, non-discriminatory 
procedure to limit access to the market where there are special constraints. 
This proposal therefore takes a balanced approach, tailored to the specific features of 
this market and to  the needs of the various partners - airports,  carriers and service-
suppliers. 
The proposal  is  based on Article  84(2)  of the  Treaty since  ground handling  is  an 
integral part of  air transport. 
It will therefore be subject to the procedure for cooperation between the Council and 
Parliament. This proposal will in no way prejudice the Commission's appraisal of any 
complaints made in individual cases on the basis of the rules on competition (Articles 
86 and 90). 
"This proposal", said Mr Oreja,  "completes the  legislative framework  for  creating a 
true single market in aviation in Europe." 
Commission  Launches  Consultations  On  Draft  Decision  Concerning  Ground 
Handling Services In Airports 
IP/9311135 
Date: 1993-12-14 
On a proposal from Mr Van Miert and Mr Matutes, the Commission today approved a 
draft  decision  authorizing  consultation  of the  European  Parliament,  the  national 
authorities,  air transport  operators  and  the  institutions  and  parties  concerned,  on a 
document relating to  ground handling services.  Ground handling covers all  services 
supplied at an airport for the aircraft itself, the passengers and the cargo. They are very 
varied and do not form a homogenous whole (ground administration and supervision, 
passenger  handling,  baggage  handling,  cargo  and  mail  handling,  ramp  services, 
cleaning, etc.). 
The aim of the consultations is to  devise measures ensuring that the beneficial effects 
of air transport liberalization are not jeopardized by restrictions of competition in the 
provision of  ground handling services in Community airports. 
Stronger competition in air transport has revealed the  existence of ground handling 
monopolies in most Community airports. Ground handling in a number of  Community 
airports is not open to competition: 
- in many cases the airport or the national carrier operates a monopoly or duopoly; 
- in addition, carriers are not always allowed to provide their own handling services. 
25 The many complaints received by the Commission on this subject are a measure of  the 
extent and general nature of  the problem. 
The new initiative was announced in August by Commissioner Van Miert (IP 714): 
"Above and beyond the question of processing complaints without delay, it seems to 
me that a  general move to  settle  the  conditions  under which the  competition rules 
should apply in this sector would be a way of opening up these markets in all twelve 
Member States.  So  that action can be taken as  swiftly as necessary it should in my 
opinion take the form of a directive adopted by the Commission itself using its powers 
under Article 90 ofthe EEC Treaty." 
"A  preliminary  draft  prepared  by  my  officials  is  even  now  the  subject  of inter-
departmental discussions within the Commission. A move of this kind would only be 
completed,  of course,  after  consulting  the  Member  States  and  all  institutions  and 
parties concerned." 
The  document  being  presented  by the  Commission  for  consultation  proposes  the 
following measures: 
- full  liberalization of all  services subject to  only minor constraints (security, space, 
etc.); 
-requirement for a minimum number of service suppliers at each airport (the number 
to be determined in the light ofthe outcome ofthe consultations), one supplier at least 
being independent of  the airport and of  the dominant carrier; 
- in any event, removal of  restrictions on own-handling; 
-transitional  periods  and  derogations  will  be  established  to  take  account  of the 
problems at certain airports; 
-framework measures: 
-Ground handling services will in any event have to be provided by operators with a 
separate legal personality from that of  the body managing the airport. 
-Procedures for  the  approval of suppliers wishing to  provide services that are  fully 
open  to  competition.  The  airport  would  have  the  right  to  impose  the  conditions 
necessary for the proper management of infrastructures and the maintenance of safety 
and  security,  provided  that  they  are  non-discriminatory  and  proportional  to  the 
purpose in view. The measures and conditions would apply to all service suppliers. 
-Impartial public tendering procedures to  designate suppliers where it is necessary to 
limit their number. 
-Transparent,  objective  and  non-discriminatory  conditions  governing  the  access  of 
suppliers and  airlines wishing to  provide their own handling services to  the  airport 
areas and facilities. 
-Machinery for consultation and conciliation between airports, carriers and suppliers 
of services, to  deal particularly with disputes concerning rent charged for  access to 
26 infrastructures  or with  changes  in  the  prices  of services  for  which the  airport  has 
secured exemption and which are therefore not open to competition. 
These measures would apply to airports and airport systems recording no less than 2 
million passenger movements or 50 000 tonnes of  cargo a year. 
Mr Van Miert and Mr Matutes will present formal proposals to the Commission in the 
light of  the results of  the consultation. 
The  Commission  obtains  a  significant  improvement  in  the  supply  of ground-
handling  services  at  Athens  airport  :  the  Commission  ends  an  infringement 
procedure begun in 1994 
IP/97/876 
Date: 1997-10-15 
The Commission obtains a significant improvement in the supply of ground-handling 
services at Athens airport : the Commission ends an infringement procedure begun in 
1994 
A number of airlines had complained to  the  Commission that the  ground handling 
services  (check  in,  despatching  luggage,  cleaning,  catering  etc.)  operated  as  a 
monopoly by Olympic Airways (OA) at Athens airport were of  poor quality and based 
on a non-transparent tariff. The service level provided did not enable them to provide 
their passengers with a quality air transport service. 
The  Commission considered that the  situation resulted  from  an  abuse of dominant 
position and  opened  an  infringement procedure.  As  a  result,  the  Greek  authorities 
carried out  works  to  improve  the  eastern terminal  at  Athens  airport  which houses 
foreign airlines. The Greek authorities also recently amended a law on temporary work 
which prevented OA from easily recruiting seasonal personnel to cope with the peaks 
of  traffic during the tourist season. 
A  new  operator,  chosen  by tender,  will  provide  as  from  1 January  1998,  ground 
handling  services in competition with OA.  With regard to  ramp  services,  a  second 
operator will begin services in accordance with the timetable envisaged by the Council 
Directive concerning access to the ground-handling market, i.e. on 1 January 1999. 
OA has put in place a system of quality control and minimum standards which it has 
committed itself to  respecting in the airports of Athens, Heraklion, Chania, Rhodes, 
Corfu  and  Salonika.  Statistics  concerning  the  respect  of these  standards  will  be 
transmitted to  the airlines at the end of each season.  OA has also  established a new 
tariff structure  better related  to  the  actual  cost of the  service.  In  order to  increase 
transparency, these 
tariffs will be published and any modification of these tariffs will be announced and 
justified. 
27 In  addition,  important  work  Is  or  will  be  undertaken  soon  m  other  Greektourist 
airports. 
28 C  MARITIME TRANSPORT 
The Commission Imposes  Fines  on  Members  of a Cartel in  the  Sea Transport 
Sector 
IP/92/242 
Date: 1992-04-01 
Sir  Leon  Brittan,  the  Member  of the  Commission  responsible  for  competition, 
welcomed the decision and made the  following  statement:  "This case represents an 
important  breakthrough  for  competition  policy  in  the  sea  transport  sector.  The 
Commission decision and the undertakings given by the Bollore Group will put an end 
to  a particularly harmful cartel. A market that was hitherto virtually sealed off from 
competition will, in fact,  be opened. The case also has implications for sea transport 
operations  generally  since  it  bears  witness  to  the  Commission's  determination  to 
ensure compliance with the Community's competition rules in this sector". 
The Commission found  that the  shipowners' committees  set up  in respect of trades 
between  France  and  11  West  African  and  Central  African  countries 1  constitute 
agreements which are contrary to the provisions of Article 85  of the EEC Treaty and 
that  their practices are  in breach of Article  86.  The  Decision follows  a  number of 
complaints  lodged by independent shipowners  against a  whole  set of practices  the 
effect of which was to  establish a cartel covering a large proportion of the bilateral 
trades between the Community and the West African and Central African countries. 
The Commission accordingly initiated procedures against four liner conferences and 
the 11  shipowners' committees covered by this Decision. 
The purpose of the shipowners' committees is to apportion between their members all 
the freight carried by liners, with machinery to  supervise this arrangement set up  to 
cover  each  of the  shipping  lines  concerned.  The  members  of the  shipowners' 
committees systematically shared out between them, on a monthly basis, all the traffic 
between France and  11  African countries.  Competition was accordingly eliminated 
leading to excessively high freight rates. 
1 The  countries  in question  are:  Benin,  Togo,  Congo,  Senegal,  Mali,  Guinea,  the 
Central African Republic and Cameroon. 
2 The Commission is continuing to examine these four cases. 
In  addition,  after  seeking  the  adoption  by  the  authorities  in  the  African  countries 
concerned, of  measures intended to reserve all freight traffic for them, the members of 
the shipowners' committees took a willing and active part in the implementation of  the 
said  measures  with  a  view  to  denying  shipowners  wishing  to  operate  outside  the 
committees access to the traffic concerned. 
The Commission points out that, in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 
22  December 1986, shipowners are entitled to  be members of liner conferences that 
have been granted a block exemption.  The  Commission will,  however,  take  action 
against attempts to establish a cartel in respect of the whole of a trade or a number of 
29 trades so as to hinder outsiders from securing access to a trade or to exclude them, the 
object or effect of  which would thus be to eliminate all effective competition. 
This is a major, serious breach of the law and the Commission has decided to impose 
fines  totalling  ECU  15  million  on  the  Delmas  Group,  Societe  Navale  de  l'Ouest, 
Navale Caennaise and the Hoegh-SW  AL  Group.  In fixing  the  level of the  fine  the 
Commission  took  account  of the  fact  that  the  Bollore  Group  has  given  certain 
important undertakings. These undertakings (see Annex) will ensure that active steps 
are taken to open up the market to intensive competition. 
Lower fines  (of between ECU 2 400 and 56  400) were imposed on  13  cross-traders 
who are members of the shipowners' committees; in fixing the level of  these fines, the 
Commission took into account, inter alia, the fact that the  said shipowners, who are 
not signatories to  the agreements setting up the shipowners' committees, played only 
an ancillary role within them. 
Lastly,  the  Commission emphasizes that,  leaving  aside  this  decision,  it  is  ready to 
enter into talks with the authorities in the West African and Central African countries 
with a view to  helping those countries' carriers secure a greater share of the traffic 
generated by their external trade. 
Commission Gives Go-Ahead to Agreements between Danske Statsbaner (DSB), 
Statens  Jaernvager  (SJ)  and  Scandinavian  Ferry  Lines  (SFL)  on  the  Joint 
Operation of a Ferry 
IP/92/396 
Date: 1992-05-18 
After expiry of the 90-day period within which it would have had to notify its doubts, 
the  Commission  decided  not  to  oppose  the  agreements  concluded  by the  above-
mentioned parties concerning the joint operation of  a ferry service between the Danish 
port ofHelsingor and the Swedish port ofHelsingborg. 
Under the agreements, notified in accordance with the opposition procedure provided 
for in Article 12 of Council Regulation No 4056/86,1  SFL, owned by the SJ group, 
and DSB will set up a joint venture, owned in equal proportion by them, to operate the 
route with a view to  making it more profitable.  This involves joint operation of the 
ferry services currently provided on the route, separately by SFL on the one hand, and 
jointly by DSB and SJ on the other. 
The  Commission  considered  that  although  the  joint operation  of the  ferry  service 
under the agreements imposes restrictions of competition on the parties, it will help to 
improve the  services provided and promote technical and economic progress whilst 
allowing consumers a fair  share of the resulting benefit.  Passengers will be offered 
more frequent  sailings on new, larger vessels, thus allowing an improvement in the 
quality of service compared with that currently provided. It will also allow capacity to 
be better matched to demand, leading to a reduction in costs and in prices charged. 
30 The Commission also  considered that the  agreements did not afford the parties the 
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in 
question since the parties remain subject to  sufficient competition on the market as 
defined below.  1 Council Regulation No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 laying down 
detailed rules  for  the  application of Articles  85  and  86  of the  Treaty  to  maritime 
transport, OJ No L 378, 31.12.1986, p. 4. 
Having noted that the parties hold a dominant position in the northern 00resund,2 the 
Commission  considered  that  the  relevant  geographic  market  for  the  purpose  of 
assessing the real effect on competition of the notified agreements is, however, wider. 
A  large  proportion of the  traffic  between Sweden  and  Denmark is  through-traffic 
going to Germany, so that the position of  the parties must also be assessed in the light 
of both the  ferry  links  between Sweden and Denmark,  i.e.  in the Kattegat and the 
00resund, and the direct ferry links between Sweden and Germany. At the request of 
the  Commission, the parties deleted a clause requiring them to  cooperate if one  of 
them set up or operated a new ferry service between Sweden and Denmark. 
The Commission therefore granted the joint operation an individual exemption under 
Article 85(3) of  the Treaty, to run for six years from 14 February 1992. It reserved the 
right, however, to review the situation at the end of  two years and to require the parties 
to submit every year their price list for the link to enable it to monitor the effect of  the 
agreements on those prices. 
As this is one of the first cases in which the Commission has applied the competition 
rules to  ferries, it should be made clear that it concerns the joint operation of a ferry 
service between two ports and consequently relates to the market for the provision of 
ferry transport services: a market on which, in principle, other transport services from 
other ports may be substituted for the service in question. This case does not in any 
way concern the market for the supply of the port services that an operator needs in 
order to provide a transport service, an activity which can, in most cases, be carried 
out  only  from  a  particular  port.  Such  ports  may  in  certain  cases  be  owned  by 
companies that also operate, through another company linked to them, a ferry service 
in competition with the operator in question.  One of the three  areas into which the 
market for ferry links between Sweden and Denmarkl may be divided, the other two 
areas being the Kattegat and the southern 00resund. 
Commission  Fines  Shipping  Companies  for  Abusing  Dominant  Position  on 
Shipping Trade between Northern Europe and Zaire 
IP/92/1110 
Date: 1992-12-23 
The  European  Commission  has  imposed  fines  totalling  10.1  MECU  on  four 
shipowners  (armateurs)  for  anti-competitive  practices  on  behalf of the  CEWAL 
shipping  conference  (Associated  Central  West  Africa  Lines).  The  Compagnie 
Maritime  Belge (CMB)  has  been fined  9.6  MECU,  while  the  remainder has  been 
31 imposed  on  Woermann  Linie,  Dafra  Line  (both  currently  owned  by  CMB)  and 
Nedlloyd. CMB has a period of four years within which to pay the fine. 
In determining the size of the fines,  the Commission took account of the minor role 
played by W  oermann, Dafra and N edlloyd, and their small market share, compared to 
the CMB. The fines also aim to reflect certain mitigating circumstances which came to 
the Commission's attention. 
Following complaints from the Danish Government and from several shipowners, the 
Commission  opened  proceedings  against  11  Shipowners'  Committees  and  4  Liner 
Conferences  (CEWAL,  MEWAC,  COWAC  and  UKWAL).  Regarding  the 
Committees,  the  Commission imposed a heavy fine  last April for  violating  the  EC 
Treaty  (Articles  85  and  86)  on  traffic  between  France  and  11  West  and  Central 
African countries. 
Today's decision, the first against a maritime conference, primarily concerns CEWAL, 
which  groups  together  several  shipping  companies  in  order  to  provide  a  regular 
shipping service between Western European ports and the ports of Zaire and Angola. 
The decision only applies to traffic between Northern European ports (except the UK) 
and Zaire. 
The Commission has found that on these routes the members of CEW  AL abused their 
dominant market position, in breach of Article 86, in three different ways in order to 
eliminate competition from their chief competitor, G&C (a common service between 
the Belgian shipowner Cobelfret and the Italian shipowner Grimaldi):-
1:  They participated in a cooperation agreement with the Zairean maritime authorities 
(Ogefrem: l'Office Zairois de Gestion de Fret Maritime) under which all cargo on this 
line would be carried by CEW  AL members. 
2:  They used the "fighting ships" method. If  a competitor offered cheaper rates than 
those  set  by  CEW  AL,  the  conference  would  hold  a  meeting  to  undercut  that 
competitor, and ensure that CEWAL members scheduled their sailings at or around the 
same  time  as  those  of the  competitor in order to  win  over its  customers.  Charges 
equivalent to  the losses incurred by the competitor would then be shared out among 
CEW  AL members. 
3:  CEW  AL  imposed  1  00%  loyalty  rebates,  under  which  members  would  have  to 
surrender all their cargo to the Conference in order to qualify for a rebate. Black lists 
would be drawn up with the names of shippers who broke the  100% rebate system. 
This went beyond the terms of  the rules 
Commission Initiates Proceedings Against The Far Eastern Freight Conference 
(FEFC) And Its  Members In  Respect Of Agreements To Fix  Inland Transport 
Tariffs 
IP/93/7 
Date: 1993-01-06 
32 On  28  April  1989,  the  Commission  received  a  complaint  lodged  by  the 
Bundesverband  der  Deutschen  Industrie  (BDI),  the  Deutscher  lndustrie- und 
Handelstag (DIHT) and the Bundesverband der Deutschen Gross- und Aussenhandels 
(BDGA),  the  bodies  which  sponsor  the  Deutsche  Seeverladerkomitee  (DSVK  -
German  Council  of maritime  shippers),  under  the  terms  of Article  10  of Council 
Regulation (EEC) n°  1017/68(1) and of Article  10  of Council Regulation (EEC) n° 
4056/86(2) laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85  and 86 of the 
Treaty to the maritime transport. 
These bodies have complained that the collective price-fixing activities of the FEFC 
and its  members are not covered by the block exemption contained in Article  3 of 
Regulation n° 4056/86, which concerns only maritime transport as  such, whereas the 
FEFC  collectively  fixes  prices  for  maritime  transport  services  but  also  for  inland 
transport services. The complainants claim that, because of the limited scope of the 
block  exemption  which  maritime  conferences  benefit  from  under  the  terms  of 
Regulation  n°  4056/86,  the  applicable  legislation  is  consequently  Regulation  n° 
1  017/68 which provides for the application of the rules of competition to transport by 
rail,  by road  and  by  inland  waterway,  and  which,  in  Article  2,  prohibits  certain 
restrictive practices including price-fixing, and which does not exempt activities of the 
type practised by the FEFC in the field of  land transport. 
According  to  the  FEFC,  the  FEFC's  tariff seeks  to  provide  a  comprehensive  rate 
structure reflecting the door-to-door services offered by its member lines.  The FEFC 
rejects  the  soundness  of the  complaint  and  argues  that  its  tariff should  not  be 
considered as  price -fixing  as  such but as  part of its  overall tariff in a competitive 
inland transport market. 
Following its examination of the complaint and without prejudice to  the subsequent 
proceedings  in  this  matter,  the  Commission,  on  the  basis  of the  material  in  its 
possession and the current state of the file, is disposed to  adopt a decision finding an 
infringement on the part of the FEFC of Article 85, paragraph 1, of the Treaty and of 
Article  2  of Council  Regulation  N°  1017/68,  the  infringement  consisting  of the 
collective fixing  of land transport rates in Europe by the member companies of the 
FEFC. 
Consequently, the Commission has decided to  send a statement of objections to  the 
FEFC  and  to  its  members,  in  order to  allow  them  to  take  note  of the  objections 
concerned, and to allow them to present their arguments in response. 
(1) OJ n° L175 of23.7.1968, p.  1 
(2) OJ n° L378 of31.12.1986, p. 4 
Commission  Terminates  Procedure  Initiated  Against  The  East  African 
Conference (EAC) 
IP/93/739 
33 Date: 1993-09-09 
The  Commission  has  terminated  the  procedure  initiated  in  October  1991  under 
Articles 85  and 86  of the Treaty against the liner conference serving trade between 
Europe and East Africa (the EAC) and member shipping companies in respect of the 
length of  notice which companies wishing to leave the Conference should give. 
The rule in question provided for a minimum period of notice of twelve months, such 
notice to expire only at the end of  a calendar year. 
The Commission had acted in response to  a complaint lodged in June  1989 by the 
Compagnie Maritime Belge (CMB) against the EAC in respect ofthe obstacles which 
the  Conference had placed in the  way of CMB's introduction of a non-Conference 
service.  The  EAC  had  then  brought  various  legal  actions  and  had  instituted  an 
arbitration  procedure  with  a  view  to  preventing  CMB  from  operating  a  new  liner 
service (non-Conference) competing with that offered by the EAC. 
CMB had lodged a complaint in which it alleged in particular that the clause of the 
Conference agreement relating to the length of notice to be given in order to leave the 
Conference was not covered by the block exemption granted to  liner conferences (by 
Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No  4056/86) and therefore constituted a restriction of 
competition that was contrary to Article 85(1) of  the Treaty. 
The Commission found  that the  arrangements  for  giving notice could restrict,  for  a 
period of up  to  two  years,  the  freedom  of a member shipping company wishing to 
leave the Conference to offer a non-Conference service as an outsider. 
The  Commission  held  that  the  period  of notice  provided  for  in  the  Conference 
agreement was unreasonably long and constituted a restriction of competition that was 
contrary to  Article 85(1).  As the provision in question did not satisfy the conditions 
necessary for it to  benefit from  the block exemption granted to  liner conferences or 
from  an  individual  exemption,  it was  therefore  declared  to  be  automatically  void 
pursuant to Article 85(2) of  the EEC Treaty. 
According to the Commission, the notice-giving clauses in the Conference agreements 
are closely linked to  effective non-Conference competition from outsider companies, 
which constitutes the main counterweight to  the block exemption granted to the liner 
conferences. 
The Commission therefore  informed the  EAC  that it  considered that the  maximum 
period of notice required  of a member before  it  could  leave  a  conference without 
incurring any penalty should not generally exceed six months  and that it should be 
possible for such notice to be given at any time. 
The  EAC  having  expressed its  intention of amending  its  Conference  agreement  as 
requested by the Commission and having in fact carried out that amendment in June 
1993, the  Commission has  decided to  terminate the  case without adopting a formal 
decision. 
34 Commission Adopts Report On  The Application Of The Competition Rules  To 
Maritime Transport 
IP/94/508 
Date: 1994-06-08 
On a proposal by Mr Van Miert, the European Commission has approved a general 
report indicating how it intends to  apply the competition rules to  liner shipping,  as 
regards  the  land  section  of multimodal  transport  operations.  This  report  will  be 
presented  for  information to  the  Transport  Council  on  13  and  14  June.  In  certain 
circumstances, it allows for individual exceptions for the fixing of uniform tariffs on 
the land section. 
The Commission is  thus complying with the undertaking which Mr Van Miert gave 
the Council on 29 November 1993. 
The  report  begins  by  analysing  the  legal  situation  of price-fixing  agreements 
concluded  by  conference  shipping  companies  concerning  the  land  section  of 
multimodal transport operations, and goes on to  consider the conditions necessary to 
ensure balance between the interests of  the shipping companies and the shippers. 
Practices 
With the development of containerization, shipping companies in the 1970s began to 
offer door-to-door transport services combining land with sea transport (multimodal 
transport). 
- The  liner  conferences  then  extended  the  fixing  of uniform  sea  tariffs  (over  the 
maritime segment) to the land section, even though Council Regulation No 4056/861 
confers a block exemption only for their sea transport operations. Under the existing 
exemption, they can lawfully fix rates within a uniform tariff only for the sea section. 
The price of land transport on European routes is a substantial proportion of the final 
price of a multimodal transport operation (between 10% and 30% depending on the 
routes). 
- Outsiders not operating within the framework of the conferences also offer door-to-
door services but at a price set by themselves alone. 
1 Regulation laying down detailed rules for the application of  Articles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty to maritime transport, OJ  No L 378, 22.12.1986, p. 4. 
Consequences 
Following a complaint lodged by shippers against a liner conference in respect of the 
fixing of  the uniform tariff, the Commission in December 1992 adopted a statement of 
objections2 in which it held that the conference agreements for the collective fixing of 
land  transport rates  infringed  Article  85(1)  and  Article  2  of Regulation  (EEC)  No 
1017/68.3  The  Commission  felt  that  the  conditions  necessary  for  an  individual 
exemption to be granted had not been demonstrated. 
The  Report  adopted  by  the  Commission  today  recognizes  the  importance  of 
multimodal  transport  in  meeting  the  needs  of shippers,  and  indicates  that  the 
35 Commission is in favour of the development ofthis mode of transport. Nevertheless it 
stresses that the fact that it is indispensable for the conferences to fix land rates for the 
supply ofmultimodal transport services has not been established. 
Members of liner conferences generally sub-contract the inland part of operations to 
inland  hauliers  and  make  their  own  inland  transport  arrangements  on  behalf of 
shippers,  with the  exception  of pricing  which is  based  on  the  conference's  inland 
transport tariff.  Each  shipping  line  usually  uses  its  own containers,  its  own inland 
container parks and its own electronic data exchange system. 
Unlike sea transport, where a conference to  some extent acts as organizer (which has 
enabled it to qualify for a block exemption since it improves the service for the user), 
a conference as  such does not have a direct role in the supply and management of the 
inland transport activities of its members and does not undertake any related activities. 
Its sole task is to fix a uniform tariff for its members. 
Such a tariff agreement does not encourage more efficient and rational organization of 
the  land  transport  of containers.  By  contrast,  the  more  efficient  management  of 
container parks and movements seems possible if shipping companies jointly (and no 
longer individually) manage the land section. 
Having  completed  this  analysis,  the  Commission  feels  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
consider  granting  a  block  exemption  or,  more  generally,  a  series  of individual 
exemptions  for  the  fixing  of land  rates.  The  fixing  of uniform  prices  restricts 
competition and cannot qualify for an exemption from the competition rules unless it 
brings about subsequent advantages for users. 
(  2 IP(93)7) 
3 Regulation of  the Council applying rules of  competition to  transport by rail,  road, 
and inland waterway, OJ No L 175, 23.7.1968, p.2. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
However, in certain circumstances, specific cooperation agreements between groups 
of shipowners or between shipowners and inland carriers could sufficiently promote 
technical or economic progress to be allowed, by individual exemption, to provide for 
uniform inland rates.  These  are,  in particular,  the  pooled management of container 
fleets and containers. 
These circumstances result from pooled activities on the land part, substantial enough 
in economic terms to justify the granting of  such individual exemptions. 
Against this background, the report envisages the following system: 
- any group  of shipowners  that has sufficiently pooled its  activities  (in conjunction 
with land transporters where appropriate) to  bring about advantages for users on the 
land  part  could  propose  a  uniform  (multimodal)  land  tariff  and  be  granted  an 
individual exemption, attributed on a case-by-case 
basis; 
36 - any other shipping line not having so pooled activities could only have an individual 
(multimodal) inland tariff based on its negotiations with inland carriers. 
The  Commission concludes by requesting the parties concerned to  comment on the 
proposals contained in the  report in order to  evaluate the  impact on the multimodal 
transport  sector  of future  cooperation  agreements,  and  urges  maritime  shipping 
companies to notify their future cooperation agreements, preferably after consultation 
with the users, with a view possibly to granting them individual exemption. 
37 "Maritime  Transport  And  Competition":  Opening  Speech  Of Mr Karel  Van 
Miert At The Maritime Forum- Rotterdam, 20 June 1994 
IP/94/559 
Date: 1994-06-21 
Address by Mr Van Miert  to  the  Maritime  Industries  Forum  (Rotterdam,  20  June 
1994) 
Without wishing to  prejudge  any individual cases currently being examined by the 
Commission,  Mr  Van  Miert  set  out  to  deal  with  the  subjects  of price-fixing  in 
intermodal transport, agreements on the management of capacities, and consortia. He 
outlined the content of the report adopted by the  Commission on  13  June on price-
fixing in intermodal transport (importance of maritime transport to Community trade, 
contraction  of the  Community  fleet,  etc).  He  said  that,  in  order  to  be  accepted, 
agreements  restricting  competition had  to  enable  transport  users  to  benefit  from  a 
substantial  share  of the  improvements  which  they  brought  about  for  shipowners. 
Without denying the importance and practicality of intermodal transport by container, 
the Commission took the view that competition rules applied to carriers in the same 
way as they did to other professions. Maritime transport already benefited from much 
more generous exemption rules than other branches of  industry under the conferences 
(Regulation  No  4056/86).  The  current  exemption  had  been  granted  in  respect  of 
maritime transport and could not be automatically extended to land transport. 
This  area of transport was  still suffering  from  poor organization.  For example,  the 
pricing agreements between shipowners on the portion of transport operations carried 
out on land had not been matched yet by management agreements between transport 
companies which would make it possible to  minimize the cost of transporting empty 
containers, which was estimated to run into billions of ecus a year. The shortcomings 
resulted from a collective lack of organization on the part of carriers. They could not, 
therefore, call for  pricing agreements without rationalizing their activities in such a 
way as  to  benefit users.  For that reason,  Mr Van Miert considered it impossible  at 
present to consider granting a general exemption from the competition rules to enable 
shipowners to  fix  rates for  land transport. Individual exemptions could, on the other 
hand,  be  contemplated  where  land  transport  services  were  organized  jointly  by 
maritime transport companies and this resulted in improved transport conditions and 
reduced costs without excessively affecting conditions of  competition. 
Mr Van Miert then referred to the existing agreements fixing both prices and capacity 
without improving services to  users.  Such agreements could not be accepted unless 
they fulfilled strict conditions. 
Furthermore, they could not be allowed to  penalize Community exporters alone by 
being applied in only one  direction.  An agreement aimed  at  reducing or not using 
capacity offered no  advantages unless it eliminated excess or inefficient capacity in 
such  a  way  as  to  reduce  costs.  Recent  examples  of freezing  capacity  in  order to 
increase  rates  did  not  represent  a  real  solution  to  the  problem  of  a  lack  of 
competitiveness on certain maritime routes in Europe, while they could prove more 
advantageous  to  non-Community,  integrated  companies  with  low  costs.  Moreover, 
substantial  increases  in  maritime  transport  rates  had had  adverse  effects  on  users. 
Without going into details of cases under way, Mr Van Miert stated that it was clear 
38 I 
that it was the Commission's responsibility to  ensure that Community exporters were 
not penalized by abnormally high  transport  costs  which  might  force  them  to  lose 
market shares or even to withdraw from certain markets. 
Finally,  Mr Van  Miert  raised  the  subject  of consortia,  which  could  prove  to  be 
effective where they were in line with current developments in means of  transport and 
helped reinforce the efficiency and competitiveness of  Community maritime transport. 
After outlining the draft Regulation published by the Commission in March, he said 
that  the  Commission was  at  present making  the  amendments  suggested  during  the 
public consultations and that a second draft would shortly be presented to the Member 
States  with  a  view  to  its  definitive  adoption,  in  principle,  in  the  autumn.  The 
Commission's objective was to create a balanced and flexible framework which would 
enable shipowners to conclude agreements restricting competition that passed on a fair 
share of  the benefits to users. Such agreements could be authorized if  they allowed for 
an adequate level of competition outside the scope of  the agreement. 
By way of conclusion,  Mr Van Miert  stressed  the  fact  that it was  the  function  of 
Community competition policy in the maritime transport sector to advocate a shipping 
industry  which balanced  the  interests  of shipowners  and  exporters  and  importers. 
Measures  primarily  aimed  at  boosting  shipowners'  profits  without  enhancing  their 
efficiency  were  in  the  true  interests  of neither  the  shipowners  nor  Community 
industry. Moreover, Community legislation had to avoid conflicts with other national 
legislation. Mr Van Miert was convinced that Community competition policy in the 
maritime sector had developed in a constructive and balanced manner, reflecting the 
interests of  both shipowners and consignors. 
Commission Prohibits Transatlantic Agreement (TAA) 
IP/94/956 
Date: 1994-10-19 
Acting on a proposal from Mr Van Miert, the Commission decided today to prohibit 
the T  AA. The agreement does not meet the conditions that would allow it to  qualify 
for  the  block  exemption  for  liner  conferences.  Nor  is  it  eligible  for  individual 
exemption under Article 85(3) since it does not provide sufficient benefits for users. 
The TAA was notified to the Commission in August 1992. A total of 15 shipping lines 
are members of the TAA (see annex).  The TAA members operate on the market for 
containerized liner shipping services between the western European ports, in the range 
from Bayonne to the North Cape, and the ports along the eastern coast of the United 
States.  They  hold  about  80%  of that  market  and  some  70%  of the  market  for 
containerized liner shipping services between Europe as a whole and the United States 
(including access to the United States via the Canadian ports). 
The TAA provides for its members to take joint decisions on matters such as  prices, 
conditions of carriage and capacity.  The TAA members draw up  tariffs  for  both the 
39 maritime and inland sectors and publish them jointly. The service contracts concluded 
by the T  AA members must conform to certain rules, in particular: 
- no contracts may last for longer than one year; 
-no contracts may be signed for annual volumes of less than 200 TEU (Twenty-Foot 
Equivalent Units) containers. 
All the members of the T  AA participate in a capacity management programme, which 
is  implemented only in the westbound, i.e.  Europe-United States, sector of the trade. 
The purpose of  the programme is to limit the supply of  transport on the market without 
reducing the real available capacity of  shipowners. 
Following numerous complaints from  firms  exporting to  the United States and from 
organizations  representing  shippers,  the  Commission  established  that  a  number  of 
practices  engaged  in  by  T  AA  members  infringed  the  competition  rules.  These 
practices included: 
- a two-tier tariff structure that differentiates between former conference members and 
independents; 
- a programme of  artificially freezing part of  the capacity available on ships; 
- an agreement on prices for inland haulage (in the case of  combined transport). 
As  a result of the  T  AA,  which affects a substantial proportion of the trade,  and the 
combined impact of the agreements on prices and capacities, the T  AA members were 
able  to  impose  very  large  price  increases  in  1993  and  1994.  The  price  increase 
resulting from the freezing of  capacity in the westbound sector (Europe-United States) 
artificially penalized European exporters. 
The practices covered by the T  AA do not fall within the scope of  the block exemption 
for liner conferences because: 
- the agreements on price fixing and on capacity restriction are not allowed under the 
block exemption for liner conferences; 
- the  T  AA  does  not  provide  for  uniform  freight  rates  for  the  transport  of goods. 
However, the members of a conference must establish a joint or uniform tariff to  be 
eligible for the block exemption. Such a requirement ensures some price stability for 
shippers  using  the  services  of  a  conference  member.  If  shipping  lines  apply 
differentiated  rates,  this  has  the  effect  of altering  the  competitive  structure  of the 
market  by  reducing  or  eliminating  competition  between  conference  members  and 
outsiders; 
- the block exemption granted to  liner conferences applies to  maritime transport and 
not to inland transport. However, the TAA price agreement covers both the maritime 
and inland sectors. 
The  Commission also  took  the  view  that the  TAA was  not eligible  for  exemption 
under Article 85(3) of  the Treaty since it is not of  sufficient benefit to users. 
40 After consulting  the Advisory Committee,  and  acting  on a  proposal from  Mr Van 
Miert,  the  Commission  has  accordingly  decided  to  prohibit  the  Translatlantic 
Agreement. The TAA had been notified to  the Commission, and the immunity from 
fines afforded by notification was not withdrawn. 
Although the T  AA members have notified the Commission of a new agreement, the 
TACA, the  TAA existed and operated between August  1992 and July  1994. It still 
constitutes  the  reference  basis  for  shipowners  in  setting  tariffs  for  1995.  The 
Commission was therefore obliged to take a decision prohibiting it. 
The  shipowners  recently  informed  the  Commission  that  they  intended  to  make 
substantial changes to  the terms of the TACA, but such changes must be formalized 
and must be examined by the Commission. 
Commission  Prohibits  The  Members  Of The  Far  Eastern  Freight  Conference 
From Fixing Prices For The Inland Transport 
IP/94/1260 
Date: 1994-12-21 
Acting on a proposal from Commissioner Van Miert, the Commission decided today 
to prohibit the members of the Far Eastern Freight Conference from fixing prices for 
the inland transport of  containerised cargo. The practice does not fall within the scope 
of the group exemption for liner conferences. Moreover, since it does not fulfill the 
conditions of Article 85(3) of the Treaty, it cannot be granted individual exemption. 
The Commission set symbolic fines to the members of  the FEFC (see annex). 
On 28 April 1989, the Commission received a complaint from the German Shippers' 
Council (DSVK), concerning certain price fixing activities of the members of the Far 
Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC) relating to multimodal transport. 
Multimodal transport services provided by the members of the FEFC consists in the 
following five elements: 
a) inland transport to the port of  embarkation 
b) cargo handling in that port 
c) sea transport 
d) cargo handling in the port of  destination 
e) inland transport from the port of  destination to the place of final destination. 
The group exemption for liner conferences, contained in Regulation 4056/86 permits 
price fixing  for  sea transport services. The BDI/DSVK complained that members of 
the FEFC agreed between themselves prices not only for sea transport but also for the 
other elements of  a multimodal transport service, including inland transport services. 
41 The Decision therefore prohibits the fixing of  prices for the following services -
The inland transport services supplied by members of  the FEFC, within the territory of 
the European Community, to shippers as part of a multimodal transport operation, for 
the carriage of  containerised cargo between Northern Europe and the Far East. 
The FEFC had argued that all  its  price fixing  activities,  including those relating to 
inland transport services, were covered by the group exemption for liner conferences 
contained in Article 3 of Regulation 4056/86. However, the scope of the exemption 
contained in Article 3 cannot be wider than the scope of  the Regulation itself. 
Article 1(2) of  Regulation 4056/86 provides that-
"it shall apply only to international maritime transport services from or to one or more 
Community ports". 
The  FEFC  has  also  argued  that  the  absence  of collective  inland rate-fixing would 
endanger the stabilizing role of liner conferences. They suggested that if inland rates 
were being  set  on an  individual basis  rather  than  collectively,  members would be 
tempted to  compete on those prices and therefore undermine the conference-set rates 
for the maritime services. The FEFC therefore considered that, if  the group exemption 
were found not to  apply, all their price fixing  activities should qualify for individual 
exemption. 
The Commission rejected this argument for the following reasons-
-an  exemption  for  one  activity  (maritime  price  fixing)  cannot  in  itself justify  an 
exemption for all other revenue producing activities, . 
-the FEFC does not itself organise directly or indirectly any inland transport activities 
other than the collective fixing of  prices and conditions for carrier haulage, 
-only  those  members  of the  FEFC  which  undertake  joint  inland  activities  which 
produce  benefits  to  consumers  can  qualify  for  exemption  under  Article  85(3)  (in 
respect of  inland price fixing), 
-other providers of inland transport services (which are  not permitted to  fix  prices) 
would be placed at a competitive disadvantage. 
The Commission set symbolic fines  (10 000 ECUs):  they mark the existence of the 
offence and the need for future compliance with the Community's competition rules by 
the  undertakings  in  question and by other undertakings  which may be engaged in 
similar practices. 
The  approach  followed  in  the  Decision  carefully  follows  that  approved  by  the 
Commission  in  its  Report  to  the  Council  (note  IP  508/94  and  BIO  94/301-1) 
concerning  the  application  of the  Community's  Competition  Rules  to  Maritime 
Transport. In particular it does not prejudge the outcome of applications for individual 
exemption  which  the  Commission  expects  to  receive  following  the  prohibition  of 
inland transport price fixing by the the members of  the FEFC. 
As  Commissioner  Van  Miert  said  "In  certain  circumstances,  specific  cooperation 
agreements between groups of shipowners or between shipowners and inland carriers 
42 could sufficiently promote technical or economic progress to be allowed, by individual 
exemption, to  provide for  uniform inland rates.  These are,  in particular, the pooled 
management of  container fleets and containers". 
43 Commission  Approves  Block  Exemption  For  Consortium  Agreements  In 
Shipping 
IP/95/409 
Date: 1995-04-28 
On a proposal from  Mr Van Miert, the Commission has  recently adopted a second 
block exemption Regulation in the liner shipping sector. 
In this sector, liner conferences - a traditional way of organizing maritime transport -
have since 1 July 1987 been covered by such an exemption 
The  new Regulation grants  block exemption to  liner shipping  consortia.  These are 
agreements aimed at establishing a greater or lesser degree of  cooperation with a view 
to providing, by means of  various arrangements, a common liner shipping service. 
The exemption 
Scope 
The exemption is to apply for an initial period of five years; it covers both consortia 
operating within a liner conference and consortia operating outside such conferences, 
in so far as they provide international liner shipping services to  or from one or more 
Community ports. 
The  service  must be  for  the  sole  carriage of cargo;  the  exemption  does  not  cover 
agreements in respect of passenger transport, between ferry companies for  example. 
The regulation forbids price fixing and only covers maritime activities and not inland 
transport activities of  the consortia. 
Description 
The  block exemption  covers  the  following  activities:  the  coordination  and/or joint 
fixing of  sailing timetables and the determination of  ports of  call; the exchange, sale or 
cross-chartering of space or slots on vessels; the pooling of vessels, port installations 
or operations offices; the provision of  containers, chassis and other equipment; the use 
of a computerized data exchange system;  temporary capacity adjustments;  the joint 
use of  port terminals; participation in various other forms of  pool; the joint exercise of 
voting rights in liner conferences; a joint marketing structure; and any other activity 
ancillary to any of  these and necessary for its implementation. 
Background 
In June 1990 the Commission presented to the Council a communication[1] in which 
it  came  out  in  favour  of granting  block  exemption  to  this  modem  method  of 
organizing liner shipping, which came into being in the late 1960s with the appearance 
of  containers. 
The growth of container services and the  amount of investment needed, notably in 
container  ships,  to  operate  such  services  meant  there  was  a  greater  need  for 
cooperation  between  shipowners.  This  cooperation  usually  took  the  form  of 
consortium agreements. 
44 The Commission's favourable attitude towards such agreements is due to the fact that 
users generally receive a fair share of  the resulting benefits. 
Thanks to  the agreements, shipowners can organize jointly the services they supply 
and thus provide users with a better service while rationalizing their maritime transport 
activities and securing economies of  scale and cost reductions. 
Objective 
The Regulation seeks to strike a balance between the interests of shipowners and those 
of transport  users.  Such  a  balance  can be  achieved  only  if,  among  other  things, 
consortia operate in trades in which they continue to  face  effective competition from 
other shipowners, thereby ensuring that shippers also benefit from the advantages of 
such  agreements.  The  Commission,  in  pursuing  a  policy  of promoting  consortia, 
cannot  act  against  the  interests  of transport  users,  who  are  working  on behalf of 
European importers and exporters, for whom the availability of a maritime transport 
service that is efficient and competitive in terms of  both quality and price is essential. 
[1] COM(90)260 of 18 June 1990. 
Commission  Says  It May  Impose Fines  On Members  Of The Trans-Atlantic 
Conference Agreement (T  ACA) 
IP/95/646 
Date: 1995-06-21 
The  Commission  has  threatened  the  sixteen  man  time  companies  of the  T  ACA 
Agreement with fines relating to inland transport rate fixing they apply. 
Indeed acting on a proposal from  Commissioner Van Miert the Commission decided 
today to  send the TACA partners a statement of objections envisages  an  expedited 
procedure enabling the  Commission to  adopt  a decision withdrawing the immunity 
from the imposition of  fines in respect to those T  ACA provisions. 
On  5  July  1994,  the  parties  to  the  Trans-Atlantic  Conference  Agreement  (TACA) 
submitted an application to the Commission seeking an exemption under Article 85 of 
the EC Treaty. 
The TACA is a revised version of  the Trans-Atlantic Agreement (TAA), an agreement 
originally notified to the Commission on 28 August 1992. The Commission adopted a 
Decision prohibiting the TAA on 19  October 1994 On 10 March 1995 the Court of 
First Instance ordered the  suspension of the T  AA Decision.  This however does not 
prejudice the decision on the substance of  the case. On 12 May 1995, the Commission 
lodged an appeal with the Court of  Justice to annul the order. 
Amongst  other restrictions  of competition,  the  T  ACA  contains  a  price  agreement 
between the parties to the TACA relating to  inland transport services supplied within 
the territory of the Community to shippers as part of a multimodal transport operation 
45 for the carriage of  containerised cargo between Northern Europe and the United States 
of  America. 
The  group  exemption  for  liner  conferences  contained  in  a  regulation  from  1986 
permits only price fixing for sea transport. The scope of this Regulation covers indeed 
solely maritime transport services from or to one or more Community ports. 
This type of agreement has been prohibited not only in the TAA Decision, but also in 
the FEFC Decision (adopted by the Commission on 21  December 1994) and, in more 
general terms, in the Commission's Report of 8th June 1994 to the Council concerning 
the Application of  the Competition Rules to Maritime Transport. In these Commission 
Decisions, it has been established that such inland price fixing agreement infringes the 
provisions of Article 85(1) of the EC  Treaty and cannot benefit from  an exemption 
pursuant to Article 85(3). 
The TACA parties have chosen to notify an arrangement which, they clearly know, is 
unlawful following the Decisions of the Commission. It is normal and consistent with 
the  Commission's  approach to  the  case that it should withdraw the  immunity from 
fines attaching to the notification. 
A decision withdrawing immunity from fines has no immediate effect. It merely opens 
the possibility for the  Commission to  impose fines  should it think fit  in its ultimate 
decision. 
Commission Gives Green Light To Five Consortium Agreements 
IP/96/400 
Date: 1996-05-08 
On the basis of  proposals from Mr Van Miert, the Commission has recently authorised 
a series of consortium agreements in the maritime transport sector. These are the first 
cases involving the application of  the regulation which the Commission adopted on 20 
April  1995  (see IP/95/409  and Annex) and which grant a block exemption to  liner 
shipping  consortia offering  international maritime  liner  services  from  one  or more 
Community  ports.  Liner  shipping  consortia  are  agreements  between  shipping 
companies, the object of which is to bring about cooperation for the joint operation of 
a maritime liner transport service by means of various  arrangements.  Four of these 
consortium  agreements,  all  of which  existed  before  the  entry  into  force  of the 
regulation,  have been authorised and may operate until  21  April  2000,  the  date on 
which the  regulation  expires.  So  far  as  the  fifth  agreement,  it  is  not  a  consortium 
falling within the scope of the exemption regulation and has been granted individual 
exemption. 
The Commission has been able to  establish that each of these consortia has not only 
allowed  the  participating  shipping  lines  to  rationalise  their  activities  but has  also 
contributed to significant improvements in the quality and frequency of liner shipping 
services offered to shippers as well as, in some cases, the number of  ports served. The 
Commission has checked that the consortia remain subject to effective competition on 
46 the routes where they operate thereby guaranteeing that shippers obtain a fair share of 
the benefits which result from these agreements. 
The following five consortia will benefit from exemption: 
(1) StLawrence Coordinated Service 
On 13  October 1995, Canada Maritime Limited and Orient Overseas Container Line 
(UK)  notified to  the  Commission the  St  Lawrence  Coordinated  Service  (SLCS),  a 
consortium  agreement  under which these  shipping  companies  operate  a joint liner 
service  between the  port  of Montreal  in  Canada  and  various  ports  in North-West 
Europe. 
On 27  March  1996,  the  Commission decided not to  oppose  this  agreement  and  to 
allow  it  to  benefit from  the  group  exemption.  In  order to  be  able  to  benefit from 
exemption, the parties agreed to delete, at the request of the Commission, a clause in 
the agreement which required all goods of Quebec or Ontario origin or destination to 
be shipped via the port of Montreal, which restricted the possibility of the parties to 
use,  even within the scope of a different agreement, the competing Canadian port of 
Halifax. This clause was not considered to be indispensable for the objectives of the 
consortium. The deletion of this clause clearly shows the wish of the Commission not 
to  allow  parties  to  a  consortium  agreement  to  impose  restrictions  of competition 
relating to routes other than the routes on which the consortium operates. 
(2) East African Container Service 
On  17  October  1995,  six  shipping companies notified to  the  Commission the  East 
African Container Service (EACS), a consortium agreement under which they operate 
a joint liner service between ports in Europe (including in the UK and Mediterranean) 
and ports in East Africa and the Red Sea. The six companies are The Charente Steam-
Ship  Co  Ltd,  DSR-Senator Lines,  Ellerman Lines  Ltd,  P&O  Containers Ltd,  WEC 
Lines,  Mediterranean  Shipping  Company.  On  27  March  1996,  the  Commission  a 
decided  not  to  oppose  the  agreement  and  to  allow  it  to  benefit  from  the  group 
exemption. 
(3) Joint Mediterranean Canada Service 
On 19 October 1995, Canaqa Maritime Limited and DSR-Senator Lines notified to the 
Commission  the  Joint  Mediterranean  Canada  Service  (JMCS),  a  consortium 
agreement under which these shipping companies operate a joint liner service between 
the port of Montreal in Canada and various ports in the eastern Mediterranean. On 2 
April  1996 the Commission decided not to  oppose the  agreement and to  allow it to 
benefit from the group exemption. 
(4) Joint Pool Agreement 
On 20 October 1995, Andrew Weir Shipping Ltd and Euro Africa Shipping Line Co 
Ltd  notified  to  the  Commission  the  Joint  Pool  Agreement  (JP A),  a  consortium 
agreement under which these shipping companies operate a joint liner service for the 
transport of  goods between the British ports of  Hull and Felixstowe and the Polish port 
of Gdynia. On 1 April 1996 the Commission a decided not to  oppose the agreement 
and to allow it to benefit from the group exemption. 
47 (  5)  Agreement  benefitting  from  Individual  Exemption  - Exemption  Decision  of 9 
April1996 
On 11  August 1995, Finncarriers Oy Ab  and Poseidon Schiffahrt AG applied to  the 
Commission for an exemption under Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty in respect of the 
Baltic Liner Conference Agreement. Under the agreement the parties operate a joint 
service on a jointly agreed schedule at jointly agreed tariff and service arrangement 
rates.  The joint service consists in the provision of regular ferry  services  for  ro-ro, 
container and rail/ferry traffic between ports and points in Finland and (i) ports and 
points in Germany (and other Continental points via German ports) and (ii) ports and 
points in Scandinavia (Sweden, Denmark and Norway), with a small volume of  traffic 
to and from Russia via Finland to those countries. 
The parties take joint investment decisions, in particular for the acquisition of vessels 
and equipment that are  specifically designed for the climatic conditions where they 
operate and which are  also  specially designed to meet the specific needs of Finnish 
shippers. The joint service is managed by Finncarriers. 
Such  an  agreement which brings  about  a  highly  integrated joint service  does  not 
amount to  a consortium agreement falling within the scope of the regulation adopted 
in April 1995 since it does not concern exclusively the transport of goods principally 
by containers. A large part of the goods are not containerised and the consortium is 
therefore  unable  to  benefit  from  the  group  exemption  and  must  benefit  from  an 
individual exemption if  it is to be authorised. 
In  order  to  obtain  the  comments  of third  parties,  in  accordance  with  normal 
procedures, the Commission published a notice in the Official Journal on 16 February 
1996  setting out a summary of the  application.  No observations were received and 
within a period of ninety days following publication the Commission considered that 
the  conditions of Article  85(3)  were  fulfilled  and  decided  on 9  April  1996  not to 
oppose  the  exemption  of this  agreement;  Accordingly,  in  accordance  with  the 
applicable regulations, the maritime activities are exempted for a period of six years 
and the inland activities (which in this case are minor) are exempted for a period of 
three years. 
The Commission Fines  Five Cross-Channel Ferry  Companies A  Total 645,000 
Ecu For Operating A Price Cartel In 1992 
IP/96/971 
Date: 1996-10-30 
The Commission decided to  fine  P&O (UK),  Stena-Sealink (S), Brittany Ferries(F), 
Sea France (F) and North Sea Ferries (NL-UK) for having agreed, in1992, to impose a 
surcharge on cross-channel freight shipments. In spite ofthe very limited success and 
the short application of this surcharge, the Commission considered that the companies 
effectively  developed  a  concertedpractice  contrary  to  article  85  of the  Treaty  and 
decided to  fine themproportionally to their responsibility and to their turnover on the 
48 market  concerned.  P&O  and  Stena-Sealink  were  fined  respectively  400,000  and 
100,000 ECU since they were the main instigators of the practice. Having played a 
minor role,  Sea France and Brittany Ferries will have to  pay a fine  of 60,000 ECU 
while North Sea Ferries is being fined 25,000 ECU. 
In  order to  compensate  for  the  effects  of the  devaluation  of the  British pound  in 
September 1992, these companies agreed, in October, to  similarly raise their tariffs. 
The surcharge was introduced in November of the same year, at identical rates,  and 
with the  same method of calculation, between the United-Kingdom and France  for 
P&O,  Stena-Sealink,  Sea  France  and  Brittany  Ferries  and  between  the  United-
Kingdom and Belgium as well as the Netherlands for P&O and North Sea Ferries. The 
Commission considered that the infringement lasted until the end of  that year. 
The simultaneous application of the surcharges was only partly sucessful because of 
the reluctance of the clients to the measure and was of short duration. That is why the 
Commission  decided  to  impose  moderate  penalties  on  the  ferry  companies  while 
establishing higher fines to P&O and Stena-Sealink as they initiated and organised the 
concertation by taking the contacts and developing the calculation scheme of  the tariff 
increase.  Sea  France,  Brittany  Ferries  and  North  Sea  Ferries  then  followed  their 
competitors.  The  five  companies  continued  however  to  coordinate  themselves 
afterwards in order to assess their clients reactions. 
The Commission Lifts The TACA Parties' Immunity From Fines In Respect Of 
Inland Rate Fixing 
IP/96/1096 
Date: 1996-11-28 
The  European Commission decided today to  adopt  a decision lifting  the  immunity 
from  fines  benefitting to  the T  ACA parties - the containers carriers members of the 
Trans-Atlantic  Conference  Agreement  - in  respect  of  inland  rate  fixing.  The 
Commission considers that inland price fixing is  a manifest and serious infringement 
of  the competition rules and that inland price fixing is not indispensable, as claimed by 
the  parties,  for  the  introduction of a  limited  form  of information exchange  on the 
location of empty container.  These arrangements do  not justify such an exemption; 
any line wishing to reduce costs and limit environmental harm has sufficient incentive 
to participate in such an arrangement. 
In its Decision to lift the immunity from fines, the Commission also states that : 
(a)  the decision does no  more than terminate an immunity which the TACA parties 
could claim by virtue of the formal notification of their agreement and re-establishes 
them in the legal position in which they found themselves before the notification (at 
which  time  they  knew  that  the  Commission  was  not  prepared  to  grant  individual 
exemption to inland price fixing), and 
49 (b) the withdrawal of immunity does not entail any obligation on the Commission to 
impose fines. It allows the Commission to  do  so  should it think fit  at the appropriate 
time. 
For procedural reasons, the Decision is not addressed to Hyundai Merchant Marine Co 
Ltd,  which  became  a  party  to  the  TACA  after  the  adoption  of the  statement  of 
objections. 
On  5  July  1994,  the  T  ACA  parties  submitted  an  application  to  the  Commission 
seeking an exemption under Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty. In principle, parties who 
notify their agreements to Commission obtain an immunity from fines in respect of  the 
activities covered by the notification. The Commission adopted, on 1 March 1996, a 
statement of objections  stating  that  it intended  to  lift  any  immunity  from  fines  in 
respect of inland rate fixing since the TACA parties had not shown either (i) that any 
benefits had arisen to  shippers from the new system of exchanging information as to 
the whereabouts of empty containers or (ii)  that inland price fixing  was in any way 
related to that system. 
Amongst other restrictions of competition, the TACA contains an agreement to fix the 
prices  of inland  transport  services  supplied  to  shippers  as  part  of a  multimodal 
transport operation. This type of agreement has been considered not only in the T  AA 
Decision, but also  in the  Far Eastern Freight  Conference Decision (adopted by the 
Commission on 21  December 1994) and, in more general terms, in the Commission's 
Report  to  the  Council  concerning  the  Application  of the  Competition  Rules  to 
Maritime Transport (June 1994). 
On 29 November 1995, the TACA parties notified to the Commission the "European 
Inland  Equipment  Interchange  Arrangement"  whereby  they  set  up  a  computerised 
reporting system for empty containers so that they are better able to conclude bilateral 
exchanges of containers.  This  in  tum is  said  to  be  likely to  reduce  the number of 
movements  of empty  containers,  the  global  cost  of which  is  estimated  to  be  a 
staggering three and a half billion US dollars per year. The TACA parties argued that 
this  arrangement  not  only  qualified  for  exemption  under  Article  85(3)  but  also 
justified exemption being granted to inland price fixing. 
The  TACA  is  the  successor  agreement  to  the  Trans-Atlantic  Agreement  (TAA) 
originally notified to  the  Commission in  1992.  The  Commission adopted  a  formal 
negative decision prohibiting the TAA on 19 October 1994. The number of members 
of the  TAA and then  T  ACA has risen  from  eleven in  1992  to  seventeen in  1996. 
Together they have  a market share  in  excess of sixty percent.  In  1995,  the  TACA 
parties  carried over 1.3  million TEUs  (twenty- foot  equivalent containers) between 
Northern Europe and the United States. 
Their customers comprise all those importers and exporters who ship their goods in 
containers, ranging from agricultural produce to white goods to raw materials. 
The Commission gives green light to the North Sea Liner Conference Agreement 
50 IP/97/12 
Date: 1997-01-15 
The European Commission has decided to  authorise the North Sea Liner Conference 
agreement in the maritime transport sector.  Under this  consortium agreement,  three 
shipping lines, Finncarriers, Poseidon and United Baltic Corporation, operate jointly a 
regular  ferry  service  by  which  they  provide  transport  services  for  ro-ro  and 
containerised  cargo  between  ports  and  points  in  Finland  and  ports  and  points  in 
Belgium and the Netherlands as well as ports and points in the UK and on to Ireland. 
The Commission has considered that the conditions of Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty 
are  fulfilled  and  has  decided  to  grant  this  agreement  an  individual  temporary 
exemption. Accordingly, the maritime activities exempted for a period of six years and 
the inland activities are exempted for a period of  three years Regulation 4056/86 of 22 
December  1986  regards  the  application  of Art.  85  &  86  to  maritime  transports  & 
Regulation 1017/68 of 19 July 1968 applies rules of competition to  transport by rail, 
road and inland waterway. 
The parties take joint investment decisions, in particular for the acquisition of vessels 
and equipment that are  specifically designed for  the  severe winter conditions in the 
eastern part of the Baltic sea.  They run the joint service according to jointly agreed 
schedules and pool their assets (vessels,  equipment and containers).  They operate a 
pooling system for their container fleet which is used not only by the North Sea Liner 
Conference  but  also  by  the  Baltic  Liner  Conference.  The  latter  agreement  was 
exempted on 9 April  1996 by the Commission see IP/96/400 about this  agreement. 
They do not have a published inland transportation tariff. 
The  Commission  considered  that  the  cooperation  in  question  has  increased  the 
efficiency of the  parties'  operations  and  has  enabled them  to  undertake  significant 
investment in equipment particularly suited to  the unique climatic conditions in the 
Baltic  sea  and  to  the  special  needs  of Finnish  shippers  which  are  located  in  a 
peripheral region. The Commission has therefore decided to  grant the agreement an 
individual exemption. 
Such an agreement which brings about a joint service does not amount to a consortium 
agreement falling within the scope of Commission Regulation n°  870/95  granting a 
block exemption to  liner shipping consortia since it does not concern exclusively the 
transport  of goods  principally  by  containers.  A  large  part  of the  goods  are  not 
containerised The transportation of cargo in containers represents approximately one 
quarter of  their business on this trade. and the consortium is therefore unable to benefit 
from the block exemption and must benefit from an individual exemption if it is to be 
authorised.  On  16  August  1995,  the parties applied to  the  Commission for  such an 
exemption in respect of  the North Sea Liner Conference Agreement. 
D  PORTS 
51 Commission Orders Interim Measures against Sealink 
IP/92/478 
Date: 1992-06-11 
Following a complaint by B&I (an Irish ferry operator) the Commission has found that 
Sealink (a British ferry operator which is also the port authority at Holyhead, Wales) 
has,  prime facie,  abused  its  dominant position,  in breach of Article  86  of the  EEC 
Treaty.  In its capacity as  port authority at Holyhead, it has permitted changes to  its 
own ferry sailing times which might cause serious damage to  B&I. The Commission 
has  ordered  interim  measures  against  Sealink  which  oblige  it to  alter  some  of its 
sailing times until the end of the Summer season. A final decision on the case has yet 
to be made. Sealink and B&I use different berths at Holyhead. B&I uses a berth in the 
mouth of the harbour.  Due to  the port's  limitations, when a Sealink vessel passes a 
moored B&I ship, the water in the harbour rises. As a result, the ramp to the B&I ship 
must be disconnected  for  safety reasons  and  loading or unloading of the  vessel is 
interrupted. In October 1991  Sealink informed B&I that it intended to introduce new 
sailing times on 9 January 1992, which would involve the movement of  two ships past 
the B&I vessel while it is in its berth. In the past, only one vessel passed a B&I ferry 
while it was loading. B&I asked the Commission to adopt interim measures to prevent 
the implementation of Sealink's new schedule on the grounds that its services would 
be seriously disrupted  due  to  the  reduced  time  available  in which to  carry out its 
loading and unloading operations. 
The Commission considers that a company which both owns  and uses  an  essential 
facility,  in  this  case  a  port,  should  not  grant  its  competitors  access  on terms  less 
favourable than those which it gives its own services. The interim measures have the 
purpose  of preventing  any  harm  which  might  occur  to  B&I  due  to  increased 
interruptions  in its  loading  and unloading procedures  and the  effects  of this  on its 
services, its customer relations and its commercial reputation. The aim of the interim 
measures is to  prevent irreparable damage to  B&I's business while the Commission 
finishes  its examination. They are limited to  the minimum necessary to  achieve this 
aim. Sealink has been ordered either to return to its previous schedule or to adopt any 
other schedule which does not lead to two vessels passing a B&I ferry during loading. 
Sealink must comply within one month of the adoption of this decision. This gives it 
enough time to inform customers who have already booked of its schedule change, so 
that  the  decision  will  not  result  in  passengers  being  stranded.  It is  hoped  that  a 
technical solution can be implemented before the next peak season at Christmas 1992. 
Irish Ferries Access To The Port Of Roscoff In  Brittany:  Commission Decides 
Interim Measures Against The Morlaix Chamber Of Commerce 
IP/95/492 
Date: 1995-05-16 
52 Acting  on  a  complaint  from  the  Irish  ferry  operator,  Irish  Continental  Group,  the 
Commission  has  decided  interim  measures  against  the  Chambre  de  Commerce  et 
d'Industrie de Morlaix, Brittany, France. The Commission decided, prima facie,  that 
the  Chamber of Commerce had abused its dominant position as the operator of the 
port of Roscoff in Brittany by refusing at this stage ICG access to  the port facilities 
there, in violation of Article 86  of the EC  Treaty. The Commission has decided that 
the CCI must grant ICG access to the port ofRoscoffby June lOth 1995. 
ICG applied to CCI Morlaix for access to Roscoff in November 1994 for the purpose 
of commencing a ferry service between Ireland and Brittany this Summer. Following 
negotiations, the parties had agreed in principle on the question of access to Roscoff 
by 16 December 1994, for the season beginning 27 May 1995, and sailing schedules 
and a number of  technical issues had been agreed. 
Following the agreement in principle of December 1994, ICG announced its services 
to  Roscoff and  began  to  take  bookings.  However,  in  January  1995  CCI  Morlaix 
indicated its wish to suspend negotiations. 
Following ICG's complaint to the Commission, further negotiations took place but no 
agreement was reached between the parties, at this stage, in particular as to the date to 
comments operations. 
The  Commission  has  decided  that,  prima  facie,  the  behaviour  of CCI  Morlaix 
amounted to a refusal to supply services. 
The port of  Roscoff is, for the time being, the only port capable of  providing adequate 
port  facilities  in France  for  ferry  services  between Brittany  and  Ireland,  a  market 
which accounted for around 100,000 passengers in 1994. At present, only one ferry 
company, Brittany Ferries, is operating between Ireland and Brittany. 
On the basis of the Commission decision CCI Morlaix must take the neccessary steps 
to  allow ICG access to  the port of Roscoff by June  lOth  1995. In the meantime the 
Commission  hopes  that  both  parties  will  find  a  suitable  solution  to  the  pending 
technical problems. 
Liberalisation In Italian Ports: A Major Step Forward 
IP/95/802 
Date: 1995-07-20 
The Italian Government has formally notified to  the Commission its commitment to 
cease anti-competition practices related to the operation of  services in Italian ports. 
Since  January  1994,  Italy  has  been  engaged  in  the  process  of amending  its  ports 
legislation  in  order  to  render  it  compatible  with  the  EU  Treaty.  The  principle  of 
opening port services to competition is central to this. However, the declared objective 
had  not  been  achieved  in  practice  because,  to  date,  the  local  authorities  had 
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of  the existing dockworkers organisations. 
In recent months, the Commission received a number of complaints on this subject. 
Faced with a situation which called into question its competition policy in the field of 
ports, the Commission considered it necessary to act. It was decided that action should 
be focused on the port of Genoa due to  its importance for the Union as  a whole, it 
being the most important Italian port, and the fact that the Court of Justice had already 
made a judgement concerning this port. 
The Commission ordered the Italian Government, on 21  June 1995, to issue, within 10 
days an authorisation to  a company which had been denied the right to  operate in a 
way constituting an abuse, by the local port authority. 
On 11  July 1995, the Italian authorities informed the Commission that the licence in 
question had been granted within the time limit imposed. This authorisation opens the 
port operation sector in the Port of Genoa to other operators of services. This measure 
will strengthen the dynamism of  the port in the face of  international competition. 
The Commission wishes to underline that its approach concerning the port of  Genoa is 
taken  in  the  context  of a  wider  action,  in  close  co-ordination  with  the  national 
competition  authority  (l'Autorita  Garante  della  Concorrenza  e  del  Mercato  ).  The 
Commission  hopes  that  the  development  in  the  port  of Genoa  will  be  a  useful 
precedent for the action taken in parallel by the national authority in other Italian ports 
with the same objective of  liberalisation. 
The  Commission  Accepts  Proposal  From  Danish  Government  To  Solve 
Competition 
Problem In The Port Of Elsinore 
IP/96/205 
Date: 1996-03-06 
In  a  letter  dated  06.03.1996  Mr Karel  Van  Miert  has  given  his  acceptance  to  a 
proposal from the Danish government of 27  February 1996 to  solve the competition 
problem in the port of Elsinore, situated north of Copenhagen. The proposal from the 
Danish government would allow a competing ferry operator to be given access to the 
ScandLines to one of the existing berths in Elsinore state port. The new ferry operator 
will be chosen following a public tender procedure. 
In his letter to the Danish Government Mr Van Miert insisted that a new ferry service 
should in any case be in a position to start operations no later than 1 June 1996. It has 
also  been  emphasized  that  the  tender  conditions,  including  its  procedure  and  the 
criteria  for  selection  have  to  be  fair,  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory  to  be 
consistent  with  competition  law.  The  Commission  is  satisfied  that  the  Danish 
government has agreed to offer access to a facility in Elsinore port, which ensures that 
a new ferry operator can compete on equal terms with the present operators. 
54 The  Elsinore port case  started in  1992  when the  Danish shipping  line,  Mercandia, 
complained to the Commission that the Danish Ministry for Transport had refused it 
permission to operate a car and passenger ferry service from the port. 
Mercandia also complained to the Danish Competition Council. Considering that the 
matter is of a character which national authorities would, in principle, be in a better 
position to solve, the Commission, applying the principle of subsidiarity, first awaited 
the final outcome ofthe Danish Competition Council's efforts to solve the matter. 
On  26  May  1993,  the  Danish  Competition  Council,  applying  national  law, 
recommended to  the Ministry for Transport:  "To the extent the capacity of the port 
terminal might already be fully used that DSB cedes part of the terminal capacity to 
alternative operators", reached a conclusion which could have solve the problem in so 
far as it proposed the introduction of  a competitor in an infrastructure the use of  which 
was in fact reserved to a subsidiary of  two national railway companies. 
However, Danish state bodies are not obliged to  follow  recommendations issued by 
the Danish Competition Council and the problem could not be resolved at the national 
level. 
As  the  Danish  Competition  Council  could  not  enforce  its  recommendation  under 
national law, Community competition law was then relied on to solve the matter. The 
Commission considered that the refusal to allow access to the port facilities in Elsinore 
would limit competition on the  Elsinore- Helsingborg  ferry  route  and reinforce  the 
dominant  position  held  by  ScandLines,  a  subsidiary  of the  two  national  railway 
companies, contrary to  Article 90  of the Treaty read in conjunction with Article 86. 
Article  90  prohibits  Member  States,  in  the  case  of  public  undertakings  and 
undertakings  to  which  they  grant  special  or  exclusive  rights,  from  enacting  or 
maintaining  measures  contrary to  the  rules  of the  EC  Treaty and  in particular the 
competition rules. Article 86 prohibits the abuse of  a dominant position. 
In July 1994 the Commission therefore started to explore the possibilities of finding a 
solution.  After  intense  negotiations,  the  Danish  government  has  now  agreed  to 
introduce competition on the ferry route between Elsinore and Helsingborg. 
Elsinore Port Opened For Access To A New Competing Ferry Service 
IP/96/456 
Date: 1996-05-30 
Mr Van Miert has announced today that on 1 June 1996 following theCommission's 
intervention against the Danish states' refusal of access  to  the port of Elsinore,  the 
Danish shipping line, Mercandia, has been allowed to  start a new ferry service from 
the port of Elsinore to  Helsingborg in Sweden. Mercandia's ferry service will provide 
an alternative service in competition with the state owned ferry  service,  ScandLines 
A/S, which has hitherto held a monopoly right to  transship motor vehicles between 
Elsinore and Helsingborg. 
55 Following a public tender on 29  April  1996 the Danish Transport Minister selected 
Mercandia among 6 other shipping lines to become the new operator on the route. In 
his  decision  to  appoint  Mercandia,  the  Transport  Minister  followed  the 
recommendation from a selection committee consisting of independent experts, which 
unanimously pointed at Mercandia as providing the best offer. 
The  Elsinore  port  case  started  in  1992  when  Mercandia  complained  to  the 
Commission  that  the  Danish  Ministry  for  Transport  had  refused  it  permission  to 
operate a ferry  service from  the port of Elsinore.  Mercandia also  complained to  the 
Danish  Competition  Council.  The  Commission  considered  the  matter  to  be  of a 
character which national authorities would, in principle, be in a position to  solve and 
applying the principle of subsidiarity, it first awaited the final outcome of the Danish 
Competition Council's efforts to solve the matter. 
On  26  May  1993,  the  Danish  Competition  Council,  applying  national  law, 
recommended to  the  Ministry for  Transport:  "To  the extent the capacity of the port 
terminal might already be fully used that DSB cedes part of the terminal capacity to 
alternative operators". This could have solved the problem in so far as it proposed the 
introduction of a competitor in the infrastructure, the use of  which was in fact reserved 
to a subsidiary of  two national railway companies. 
However, Danish state bodies are not obliged to  follow  recommendations issued by 
the Danish Competition Council and since 1994, when it became clear that the Danish 
Government would not  respect the  Danish  Competition Council's recommendation, 
Community competition law was relied on to solve the matter. 
The Commission contacted the  Danish government informally  and  pointed out the 
legal  position  under  Community  law.  Following  intense  negotiations  but  without 
opening a formal infringement procedure, the  Commission obtained on 27  February 
1996 the Danish government's consent to  allow a new operator access to one of the 
berths in the port of  Elsinore, which was used by ScandLines. The Danish government 
insisted, however, on selecting the new operator following a public tender procedure. 
The Commission accepted the Danish government's proposal,  being satisfied that it 
had agreed to offer access to a facility in Elsinore port, which would ensure that a new 
ferry operator could compete on equal terms with the present operator. However, the 
acceptance  was  given  on  the  condition  that  the  tender  conditions,  including  its 
procedure and the  criteria for  selection should lead to  access to  be given on a fair, 
reasonable  and  non- discriminatory  basis  to  a  second  service  provider  to  prevent 
distortion  between  incumbent  and  new  enterprises  so  as  to  be  consistent  with 
competition law. The Commission also insisted that the new operator should be in a 
position to start operations no later than 1 June 1996. 
Legal basis for the case 
Article 90 of the Treaty prohibits Member States, in the case of public undertakings 
and undertakings  to  which they  grant special or exclusive rights,  from  enacting  or 
maintaining  measures  contrary to  the  rules  of the  EC  Treaty  and  in particular the 
competition rules. 
The refusal by the Danish government to authorize the provision of port services to a 
competing ferry service in Elsinore had the effect of eliminating a potential competitor 
56 on the 0resund and hence protecting and reinforcing the commercial position held by 
DSB  and  SweFerry,  contrary to  Article  90  of the  Treaty  read  in  conjunction with 
Article 86. 
An undertaking that owns or manages a port facility from which a maritime transport 
service is provided acts contrary to Article 86, when it exploits its dominant position 
on the  market for  port services to  protect or strengthen the position of the  existing 
operator in  the  separate  but related  market  for  maritime  transport  services.  This  is 
especially so when the port operator without objectively justifiable reasons refuses to 
allow new companies access to the infrastructure in question or, by allowing access on 
less  advantageous  conditions  than  those  applied  to  the  activities  of the  existing 
operator, puts new companies in a less advantageous position. 
La Commission condamne Ia politique portuaire italienne 
IP/97/907 
Date: 1997-10-21 
La Commission Europeenne,  a  !'initiative  de  M.  Karel  VAN  MIER  T,  a  adopte  ce 
mardi  21  octobre  deux  decisions  qui  declarent  illegales  d'une  part  le  monopole  -
condamne par la Cour en  1991  - dont continuent de  beneficier les  corporations de 
dockers italiens pour foumir de la main d'oeuvre temporaire et d'autre part, le systeme 
- deja condamne par la Cour en  1994 - qui accorde aux deux compagnies maritimes 
publiques  (  Tirrenia  di  Navigazione  et  Italia  di  Navigazione)  des  rabais 
discriminatoires par rapport aux autres compagnies de ferries operant dans le port de 
Genes. Les autorites italiennes doivent mettre fin a cette double infraction et informer 
la Commission dans un delai de deux mois des mesures prises a cet effet. 
La premiere decision conceme la loi de reforme portuaire et demande de mettre un 
terme  au  monopole  des  compagnies  portuaires  en  matiere  de  main  d'oeuvre 
temporaire. Deja en 1991, la Cour de Justice Europeenne avait condamne le systeme 
qui  reservait  le  droit  d'effectuer  les  operations  portuaires  a  des  corporations  de 
dockers. 
Malgre une premiere mise  en  demeure  de  la  Commission,  l'Italie n'a opere  qu'une 
liberalisation partielle du marche. Certes, la loi de reforme prevoit que des entreprises 
independantes repondant a certains criteres objectifs soient autorisees a l'exercice de la 
profession. Neanmoins, cette loi  continue de reserver aux anciennes corporations de 
dockers le privilege substantiel de foumir de la main d'oeuvre temporaire, leur offrant 
par la des avantages concurrentiels indus. 
La Commission a fait usage de  son pouvoir de  decision apres avoir constate que, six 
ans  apres  l'arret  de  la  Cour,  les  dockers  continuent de  beneficier de  privileges  au 
detriment de  !'interet general et du developpement economique des villes portuaires 
italiennes. 
La  seconde  decision  demande  a  l'Italie  de  mettre  fin  au  systeme  de  rabais 
discriminatoires sur le tarif de pilotage appliques dans le port de Genes. 
57 Ce systeme deja condamne par la Cour en 1994, vise a favoriser les deux compagnies 
maritimes  publiques  nationales  au  detriment  des  autres  compagnies  de  ferries 
desservant le port de Genes. L'Italie a modifie a deux reprises les tarifs en question en 
maintenant, cependant, leur caractere discriminatoire. La decision de  la Commission 
vise  a  assurer  que,  pour  un  meme  service  fourni  par  les  pilotes,  les  differentes 
compagnies maritimes jouissent d'une egalite de traitement. 
La Commission a le ferme espoir que ces deux decisions contribueront a relancer le 
mouvement plus ample de liberalisation dans le milieu portuaire italien, dans !'interet 
des entreprises et des citoyens. 
E  RAILWAYTRANSPORT 
Commission Authorizes An Agreement Establishing A Price Structure For The 
Combined Transport Of Goods 
IP/93/143 
Date: 1993-02-25 
Acting on a proposal from Mr Van Miert, the Member of  the Commission with special 
responsibility  for  competition policy,  and  following  a  favourable  opinion from  the 
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices, the Commission has adopted a decision 
which authorizes an agreement establishing a common price structure to be applied by 
the twelve main railway companies in the Community. The agreement was concluded 
in 1990 by the railways that were members of  the "Interunit Subsidiary Committee" of 
the International Railways Union (UIC).  Railway companies only exceptionally sell 
combined  transport  services  direct  to  consignors.  In  the  vast  majority  of cases, 
combined  transport  services  are  sold  by  specialized  operators  which  may  be 
subsidiaries of  railway companies or independent companies. 
The  agreement establishes  a common price  structure for  the  sale of rail haulage  to 
these operators. It defines  a grid of coefficients which are to  be used in calculating 
prices (based on the lengths and weights of loads), but it does not actually lay down 
pnces. 
The Commission takes the view that the agreement will restrict competition, because 
without it each railway company could adopt its own tariff to  attract traffic operating 
on  competing  combined  transport  routes.  Against  that,  however,  the  new  tariff 
structure  will  make  it  easier  to  set  international  prices,  and  operators  purchasing 
haulage  from  the  railways  will  more  easily  be  able  to  compare  the  different 
international  routes  and  thus  to  take  advantage  of competition  between  them.  A 
common tariff structure that will be in force for several years also gives operators the 
stability they need to invest. 
58 The  Commission  has  decided  to  authorize  the  agreement  for  five  years,  and  has 
attached conditions intended to ensure that combined transport operators are protected 
against abuse of  the agreement on the part of  the railways. 
Mr Van Miert has reiterated his  view that combined transport should play a greater 
part  in  the  international  transport  of goods.  The  exemption  decision  which  the 
Commission has adopted here is  fully  in line with that policy approach, which was 
reflected in the  adoption of Council Directive  91/440/EEC  of 29  July  1991  on the 
development ofthe Community's railways. 
The Commission Approves The Agreement On The Use Of The Channel Tunnel 
Concluded Between Eurotunnel, British Railways Board And Societe Nationale 
Des Chemins De Fer Francais 
IP/94/1202 
Date: 1994-12-14 
On  a  proposal  from  Mr Van  Miert,  the  Commission  has  approved  an  agreement 
between Eurotunnel,  the  holder of the  Channel Tunnel  concession,  and the  British 
Railways Board (BR) and Societe national des chemins de  fer fran<;ais  (SNCF), two 
railways equipped to operate international trains. 
The usage contract, which is concluded for 65  years, divides the Tunnel capacity into 
two:  one half reserved for  shuttle trains,  operated so  far  exclusively by Eurotunnel, 
and the other half for passenger and freight trains linking the UK and the Continent. 
Under the agreement, BR and SNCF are entitled throughout the term of the agreement 
to  50%  of the total capacity of the  Tunnel,  i.e.  100% of the  capacity reserved for 
international  trains,  unless  they  agree  to  surrender  part  of their  entitlement,  any 
withholding of such agreement requiring justification. 
In return,  BR and  SNCF  undertake  to  run as  many passenger and  freight trains  as 
possible through the Tunnel and to pay Eurotunnel usage charges. 
BR and SNCF are also to pay a proportion of the costs of maintaining and renewing 
the infrastructure. The railways have furthermore undertaken each to provide on their 
side of the Channel modem rail infrastructures enabling trains, and in particular high-
speed trains, to operate between the UK and France. 
The Commission takes the view that the division of Channel Tunnel capacity between 
shuttle  services  and  international trains  and  the  reservation of a  large  share of the 
hourly paths for BR and SNCF has the effect of  restricting competition. 
However, the positive aspects of  the agreement also count. Construction of  the Tunnel 
is a major investment, to be recouped over a very long period. 
In this context, the undertakings on the part of  BR and SNCF to operate as many trains 
as possible and to pay charges in a lump-sum form throughout the first 12 years make 
59 a direct contribution to the project's financial equilibrium and ensure its success. They 
also represent important guarantees for the banks which are providing finance for the 
project. 
Lastly, the agreement enables users  to  benefit directly from the introduction of new 
transport services from the opening of  the Tunnel. 
The  Commission therefore  takes  the  view  that  the  agreement  is  likely  to  promote 
economic progress and should be authorized. 
Conditions must, however, be attached to ensure that the restrictions of  competition do 
not go  beyond what is  strictly necessary and that other rail enterprises can operate 
services in competition with BR and SNCF. In this connection, BR and SNCF have 
informed the Commission that they intend over the first  12  years  effectively to  use 
around  75% of the  capacity reserved  for  international trains.  The  Commission has 
therefore made its exemption conditional on BRand SNCF allowing the infrastructure 
manager to  use  the  hourly paths  which they do  not need,  i.e.  25%  of the  Tunnel 
capacity  reserved  for  international  trains.  These  shares  will  be  reviewed  by  the 
Commission after 12 years. 
For the rest, the Commission considered that, having regard to the exceptional nature 
of  the Channel Tunnel, the agreement could be exempted for 30 years. 
By exempting the  agreement and ensuring that BR and  SNCF have the  number of 
hourly paths they actually need, the Commission stresses the importance it attaches to 
the  construction  and  financing  of new  transport  infrastructures  in  Europe,  while 
ensuring that competition between operators is not eliminated. 
60 Commission Imposes Fine On Deutsche Bahn For Abuse Of Dominant Position 
IP/94/259 
Date: 1994-03-29 
Competition: Articles 85 and 86 
The  Commission  received  a  complaint  that  Deutsche  Bahn  was  applying 
discriminatory pricing on the market for the rail transport of sea-borne containers. The 
complaint was lodged by HOV SVZ, an association of undertakings operating in the 
port ofRotterdam. 
According  to  the  complainant,  Deutsche  Bahn has  for  many  years  been using  its 
monopoly on the market for rail services in Germany to impose cheaper rail transport 
tariffs, charged by the combined-transport operator Intercontainer, for the combined 
transport of sea-borne containers transiting through the  German ports (Bremen and 
Hamburg) rather than through the Belgian and Dutch ports, so  as  to  favour its own 
services. 
The investigation carried out by the Commission bore out the complaint. In 1992, the 
prices per kilometre for  the  carriage of full  containers  from  Rotterdam to  Germany 
was higher (by as much as  42%) than the prices per kilometre from Hamburg. In the 
case of  certain special trains, the price differences could be as much as 77% cheaper if 
carriage was carried out from Hamburg. 
In  the  case  of certain  destinations  within  Germany,  the  price  per  kilometre  is 
admittedly lower from Rotterdam than from Hamburg. However, such destinations are 
always  much further  from  Rotterdam  than  from  Hamburg.  Consequently,  the  total 
price charged to  the  consignor remains  lower  from  Hamburg.  This  means  that the 
advantage in terms of price per kilometre enjoyed in such instances by Rotterdam has 
no practical effect on the market. 
Such price differences are  all the more unacceptable since,  as the representatives of 
the relevant undertakings emphasized during the proceeding, competition from other 
means of transport is much fiercer on the western routes than on the northern routes, 
so  that in overall terms prices should be lower on the western routes, contrary to the 
situation that actually applies. By imposing uncompetitive prices for rail transport via 
the western ports, DB has in fact encouraged consignors to use road transport, whereas 
the  Community's policy and  the  policy of the  Member States is  on the  contrary to 
promote the use of  rail transport. 
These practices have appreciably restricted competition,  firstly,  between the railway 
companies  and  the  combined-transport  operators  serving  the  various  routes  and, 
secondly, between the German ports and other ports in the Community. 
DB's conduct is  an abuse of a dominant position, in breach of Article 86  of the EC 
Treaty.  Although,  at  the  time  of the  facts,  the  principle  of DB's  monopoly on its 
infrastructures was not at issue, it was none the less unacceptable for an undertaking 
that  enjoyed statutory protection against  any  competitors  to  abuse  its  monopoly in 
order to promote its own activities and those of its subsidiary. 
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markets, which is contrary to one of  the fundamental objectives of  the Treaty. 
DB's  conduct  also  restricted  competition between ports,  mainly  at  the  expense  of 
Antwerp and Rotterdam, and mainly to the benefit of  Hamburg. 
Lastly, it should be emphasized that DB's management was fully aware of  what it was 
doing in charging discriminatory prices and that the infringement was committed over 
a long period. 
Consequently, the Commission has decided to impose a fine of 11  MECU on DB for 
infringement of  Article 86. 
In  addition,  DB  concluded  in  1988  an  agreement  with  SNCB,  Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen,  Transfracht  and  Intercontainer,  known  as  the  "Maritime  Container 
Network" agreement. The purpose of the agreement was the joint marketing (by DB, 
SNCB,  NS,  Transfracht  and  Intercontainer)  of combined-transport  services  on  the 
basis of a joint tariff grid. The agreement, which was a reaction to the discriminations 
imposed  by DB,  proved  a  disappointment  to  the  parties,  since  it  enabled  DB  to 
increase further the effects of  its dominant position vis-a-vis its partners. 
The agreement was terminated after the Commission sent its statement of objections. 
Accordingly, no  fine  is imposed for  participation in the  agreement, which infringed 
Article 85. 
Mr Van Miert stresses that this decision is fully in line with the measures taken by the 
Council and the Commission to promote rail transport and combined transport. Such a 
policy means  that  consignors  must  be  able  to  draw  on  the  services  of combined-
transport operators  that  are  competitive  and  able  to  provide  efficient  services  on a 
European scale. It is therefore not acceptable for undertakings in a dominant position 
to abuse it so as to maximize their income by preventing combined-transport operators 
from offering more competitive prices, and for such undertakings thus to work against 
the general interest. 
The  Commission  Approves  a  Cooperation  Agreement  between  Railway 
Undertakings to Operate Intermodal Services between the United Kingdom and 
the European Continent 
IP/94/762 
Date: 1994-07-28 
Article 85 of  the EC Treaty 
On  a  proposal  from  Mr Van  Miert,  the  Commission has  approved  the  agreement 
between British Railways,  France's  SNCF  and  Intercontainer on the  formation of a 
joint subsidiary: "Allied Continental Intermodal Services Ltd." (ACI). 
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bodies and semi-trailers from terminal to  terminal between the United Kingdom and 
destinations  in  Italy,  Spain,  Switzerland,  Austria,  Germany  and  France  via  the 
Channel Tunnel. 
ACI will offer its services to  shippers and possibly to  other transport operators. BR 
and SNCF will provide ACI with the rail traction necessary to  operate the combined 
transport trains. They have also undertaken to place at ACI's disposal a large number 
of  special wagons suited for transport through the Channel Tunnel. 
The Commission considers that this agreement has the effect of  restricting competition 
between the undertakings in question and that it constitutes a barrier to  the entry of 
other operators. 
However,  the  positive  aspects  of the  creation  of ACI  have  also  to  be  taken  into 
account.  It  provides  shippers  with  new  wagons  for  an  efficient,  regular  transport 
service as soon as the Tunnel becomes fully operational. In addition, the groupage of 
consignments by ACI is important to the future success of  intermodal transport. 
The Commission therefore considers that the agreement is likely to promote economic 
progress and should be approved. 
However, it must be ensured that other transport operators can enter the market and 
compete with the undertakings in place. For this reason, the Commission has made its 
exemption conditional upon BR and SNCF selling to  all operators the same essential 
rail  services  they  have  undertaken  to  sell  to  ACI,  and  to  hire  out  any  unused 
specialized wagons. 
In exempting this agreement, the Commission stresses the importance it attaches to the 
development of  intermodal transport, while at the same time ensuring that competition 
between operators is not distorted. 
Commission Authorizes Agreement Between Rail Companies On Carriage Of 
New Motor Vehicles 
IP/94/826 
Date: 1994-09-08 
Article 85 of  the EEC Treaty 
Acting  on a  proposal  from  Mr Van Miert,  the  Commission on  7  September  1994 
authorized an agreement between thirteen European rail companies to set up a "Motor 
Vehicle Interest Grouping". 
The grouping is based on a framework cooperation agreement between rail companies 
relating to the international carriage of  new motor vehicles. 
63 The  objective  of the  rail  companies  is  to  create  the  conditions  conducive  to  the 
increased use of rail transport for  the  carriage of motor vehicles between assembly 
plants and distribution centres. 
In this context, the rail companies will together draw up primarily: 
- the strategy to be followed on the relevant market; 
-the marketing objectives; 
- a common tariff structure. 
Tariffs are set not by the grouping but, for each international route, by the companies 
directly involved. 
In addition, the grouping does not provide any transport services directly: these are the 
sole responsibility of  the rail companies. 
The  Commission  took  the  view  that  the  effect  of this  agreement  was  to  restrict 
competition between rail companies but that the positive effects had also to be taken 
into account. 
The agreement is such as to  improve the quality and the organization of services and 
thus  to  promote the  development of rail  transport,  as  encouraged by the  European 
Union. 
Consequently, the Commission decided that the agreement should be exempted from 
the ban on restrictive practices. 
In general, the Commission is of  the opinion that rail transport is a particularly suitable 
form of transport for certain products, such as  new motor vehicles leaving factories, 
and that its use should, therefore, be encouraged. 
Commission Gives Go-Ahead To An Agreement Between Railway Undertakings 
To Run Night Trains Through The Channel Tunnel 
IP/94/870 
Date: 1994-09-22 
On 21  September, on a proposal from Mr Van Miert, the Commission authorized an 
agreement between British Rail (BR), Deutsche Bahn (DB), Nederlandse Spoorwegen 
(NS)  the  Societe Nationale  des  Chemins  de  Fer Fran9ais  (SNCF)  and  the  Societe 
Nationale des Chemins de Fer Belges (SNCB), to run night passenger trains between 
the United Kingdom and the Continent. 
They have  set up  a specialized subsidiary,  European Night Services Ltd (ENS),  to 
organize and run night train services to meet the needs of  three kinds of  passenger: 
64 - business travellers who normally travel by air but may prefer a night rail  service 
offering comfortable cabins, with a high level of service and timetables which fit  in 
with business meetings; 
- leisure travellers looking for a high level of  comfort; 
- leisure  travellers  looking  for  lower  fares  and  willing  to  accept  a  lower level  of 
comfort, and specifically reclining seats instead of  beds. 
ENS should, from 1995, be running one train per night in each direction on each of  the 
following routes: 
-London-Amsterdam 
-London-Frankfurt/Dortmund 
- Paris-Glasgow/Swansea 
- Brussels-Glasgow  /Plymouth. 
ENS will not have its  own locomotives but will purchase traction from the railway 
undertakings. 
The Commission took the view that this agreement was likely to  restrict competition 
between the parties to it and between them and other operators, who will be faced with 
an obstacle to entering the market in question. 
However, such an agreement also  has advantages for consumers. Both business and 
leisure travellers will clearly benefit from new high-quality rail services, and also from 
competition  between  these  new  services  and  air  transport.  The  Commission  has 
therefore decided to authorize the agreement for eight years. 
In order not to prevent other operators from offering similar services, the Commission 
is requiring the railway undertakings to sell to them the rail services they have agreed 
to sell to their subsidiary, on the same terms. 
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